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I. INTRODUCTION
“When men and women sign up to put on the uniform and defend our country,
they sign a contract.  We need to make sure that America is living up to our
part of that contract.”1
At the culmination of the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln
called on Congress “to care for him who shall have borne the battle
and for his widow, and his orphan.”2  These words have become em-
blematic of one of America’s greatest moral obligations: to care for its
veterans, who have risked their lives to protect our nation.  In return
for their service, Congress created the Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA) to administer a number of benefits programs that support Ameri-
can veterans and their families.3  These programs reflect the deep
sense of pride and gratitude that Americans feel toward the nation’s
service members.  As the VA proudly proclaims on its website, “The
United States has the most comprehensive system of assistance for
veterans of any nation in the world.”4
Given both the size of the Armed Forces and the regularity with
which it is utilized, the veterans’ benefits system plays a central role
in American life.  Nearly 3.3 million people currently receive benefits
from the VA, including veterans who became disabled while serving,
survivors of service members who died during active duty or while
serving in combat, and low-income veterans who receive pension bene-
1. Addressing the Backlog: Can the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Manage
One Million Claims?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and
Mem’l Affairs of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 111th Cong. 1 (2009) (state-
ment of Rep. John J. Hall, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Disability Assistance
and Memorial Affairs), available at http://democrats.veterans.house.gov/hear
ings/transcript.aspx?newsid=426.
2. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VA HISTORY IN BRIEF 5, available at http://www.va.
gov/opa/publications/archives/docs/history_in_brief.pdf (last visited May 5, 2010).
3. See id. at 12 (discussing Congress’s creation of the Veterans Administration, now
called the Department of Veterans Affairs).
4. VA History, DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.va.gov/about_va/vahistory.
asp (last visited May 5, 2010).
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fits.5  The vast majority of veterans’ benefits are disability benefits
that compensate veterans for their average impairment in earning ca-
pacity and for a reduction in their quality of life due to an injury in-
curred during service.6  About 3.1 million veterans currently receive
disability benefits,7 which play an essential—and oftentimes life-sus-
taining—role in their lives.
But despite the importance of veterans’ benefits and the concomi-
tant necessity that they be dispensed in a timely manner, the VA’s
system for adjudicating benefits claims has become nothing short of a
national disgrace.  The VA has a backlog of nearly one million claims,
and the current VA Secretary, Eric Shinseki, has estimated that
claims will likely increase by 30% in 2011.8  Without a systemic over-
haul, the VA predicts that by 2015, some 2.6 million claims will be
backlogged—a 250% increase in just five years.9
Even more staggering than the backlog, however, are the VA’s de-
lays in deciding benefits claims, particularly those decisions that are
appealed.  By the VA’s own estimate, a veteran seeking an initial deci-
sion on a disability benefits claim must wait an average of nearly six
months for the VA to accept or reject the claim,10 while thousands of
veterans will wait at least twice as long.11  Unfortunately for many
veterans, this is only the beginning of their wait for a benefits deci-
sion.  Approximately 12% of those veterans who file claims are denied
each year, forcing those veterans to enter the VA’s dreaded appellate
5. See Facts about the Department of Veterans Affairs, DEPT. OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
1 (Jan. 2009), http://www.va.gov/opa/publications/factsheets/fs_department_of_
veterans_affairs.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2011); VA Benefits and Health Care Utili-
zation, DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www1.va.gov/VETDATA/Pocket-Card/
4X6_summer10_sharepoint.pdf  (last visited May 5, 2010) (showing breakdown of
recipients of benefits).
6. Linda J. Bilmes, Soldiers Returning from Iraq and Afghanistan: The Long Term
Costs of Providing Veterans Medical Care and Disability Benefits 6 (John F. Ken-
nedy Sch. of Gov’t Faculty Research Working Paper Series, No. RWP07-001,
2007), available at http://web.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/cita
tion.aspx?PubId=4329 (follow hyperlink to pdf).
7. VA Benefits and Health Care Utilization, supra note 5.
8. Marin Cogan, Vets Battle Disability-Claim Backlog, POLITICO (Feb. 23, 2010),
http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=F7C8F350-18FE-70B2-A89E64CF86
2BFF98.
9. Kimberly Hefling, VA Tests System for Electronic Disability Claims, BOSTON
GLOBE (March 25, 2010), http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/
2010/03/25/va_tests_system_for_electronic_disability_claims/.
10. Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake (VCS), 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1073 (N.D.
Cal. 2008) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Veterans for Common Sense v.
Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2011).
11. Office of Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Audit of VA Regional Office
Rating Claims Processing Exceeding 365 Days, DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, 24
(Sept. 23, 2009), http://www4.va.gov/oig/52/reports/2009/VAOIG-08-03156-227.
pdf.  Thousands of claims assessed in the audit had been pending for approxi-
mately 1.3 years. Id.
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system, derided as “the hamster wheel” by many veterans.12  The VA’s
appellate system takes approximately 4.4 years to adjudicate an aver-
age benefits appeal,13 and, even then, many cases are remanded, forc-
ing veterans to begin the process all over again.14
These delays take a severe toll on our disabled veterans, presuma-
bly exacerbating the effects of the financial hardship and post-trau-
matic stress disorder that many already experience and that might be
the very subject of their claim for benefits.15  Because disability bene-
fits compensate veterans for their impairment in earning capacity, the
failure to receive those benefits amounts to an untenable situation.  A
lack of crucial financial support just as a veteran is reentering civilian
life can diminish a veteran’s ability to buy food and clothing for him-
self and his family, to make mortgage payments, and to avoid serious
mental health problems.  And this combined financial and psychologi-
cal impact only contributes to the foreclosure, divorce, and even sui-
cide that is prominent among veterans.16
The systemic delays veterans are forced to confront in the VA’s
claims adjudication process are not only morally unconscionable, but
they also violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The Constitution, which empowers the President to send the Armed
Forces into battle, also forbids the executive branch from depriving a
veteran of “property” without providing “due process of law.”17  It is
well established that statutory entitlements, such as veterans’ disabil-
ity benefits, are a constitutionally protected form of “property,” and
that as a result, the government may not deprive recipients of their
entitlements without applying fair procedures.18  More recently,
courts have also found that applicants for entitlements—those indi-
viduals whom the government has yet to adjudicate as qualifying re-
cipients—possess a constitutionally protected property interest that
12. VCS, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (explaining that “[r]oughly 88% of veterans are
granted [benefits for] at least one claimed disability”); see also Michael Serota,
Op-Ed, Justice Delayed is Justice Denied, S.F. CHRON. (June 1, 2010), http://www.
sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/opinionshop/detail?entry_id=64633; Michael Serota, Op-
Ed, Vets Suffer While Benefits Appeals Drag On, AOL NEWS (Nov. 11, 2010),
http://www.aolnews.com/2010/11/11/opinion-vets-suffer-while-benefits-appeals-
drag-on/.
13. VCS, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
14. Id. at 1075.
15. RAND CTR. FOR MILITARY HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, INVISIBLE WOUNDS OF WAR:
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE INJURIES, THEIR CONSEQUENCES, AND SERVICES TO
ASSIST RECOVERY 128–31, 143–44 (Terri Tanielian & Lisa H. Jaycox eds., 2008)
[hereinafter INVISIBLE WOUNDS].
16. Id.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970) (holding that welfare benefits
are a form of “property” protected by the Due Process Clause).
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affords them a fair adjudication of their entitlement claims.19  In this
Article, we argue that the VA’s nearly five-year delays in adjudicating
claims for disability benefits that affect the essential and basic needs
of veterans fail to provide veterans with the fair adjudication to which
they are entitled.  As a result, we conclude that the judiciary must
take remedial action.  We then explain why an equitable injunction
directing the VA to remedy these delays within a fixed deadline is the
only way to adequately safeguard the due process rights of veterans.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides the history, back-
ground, and mechanics of the VA and its claims adjudication process.
Part III analyzes the claims adjudication process in light of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Part IV discusses the judici-
ary’s role in remedying systemic constitutional problems, and then
proposes an injunction to resolve the VA’s widespread due process
violations.
II. VETERANS’ BENEFITS AND THE CLAIMS
ADJUDICATION PROCESS
A. A Brief History of Government Assistance to Veterans
The practice of providing benefits to American service members is
deeply rooted in American history.  In fact, veterans’ benefits predate
the founding of the United States: the first recorded provision of veter-
ans’ benefits in America occurred in 1636 when the Plymouth Colony
offered money to those who became disabled while defending the col-
ony against Native Americans.20  A century later, the Continental
Congress tried to recruit and retain soldiers by passing a law granting
veterans “half pay for life in cases of loss of limb or other serious disa-
bility.”21  In 1789, the same year the U.S. Constitution was ratified,
Congress enacted the first federal pension for veterans.22
In 1817, President James Monroe proposed granting pensions to
indigent veterans of both the Revolutionary War and the War of
1812.23  Although some members of Congress argued that establishing
a pension system might be too costly, Monroe’s program eventually
19. See, e.g., Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting
Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors v. Derwinski, 994 F.2d 583, 588 n.7 (9th Cir.
1992)) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Kapps v. Wing,
404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that “applicants for benefits, no less
than current benefits recipients, may possess a property interest in the receipt of
public welfare entitlements”).
20. See VA HISTORY IN BRIEF, supra note 2, at 3.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Peter M. Juul, The History of Veterans Affairs, in SERVING AMERICA’S VETERANS:
A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 15, 16 (Lawrence J. Korb et al. eds., 2009) (quoting
RICHARD SEVERO & LEWIS MILFORD, THE WAGES OF WAR: WHEN AMERICA’S
SOLDIERS CAME HOME: FROM VALLEY FORGE TO VIETNAM 32–33 (1989)).
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passed, and over 15,000 veterans began receiving compensation.24
Over the next decade, the implementation of Monroe’s pension system
consumed an increasing portion of the nation’s finances, and in 1833,
Congress established the Bureau of Pensions, the first administrative
entity dedicated solely to assisting veterans.25  This arrangement con-
tinued, with minor adjustments, until the Civil War.26
After the Civil War, the number of veterans significantly ex-
panded.  At the war’s inception in 1861, the nation had approximately
80,000 veterans;27 by the war’s conclusion four years later, the num-
ber of veterans had increased to 1.9 million.28  In response to this in-
crease, President Lincoln famously called on Congress to ensure that
the government would support veterans injured during the war and
the families of those who perished on the battlefield.29  Congress re-
sponded, and during the following sixty years, benefits programs grew
to include disability compensation, insurance for service members and
veterans, family allotment programs for service members, and voca-
tional rehabilitation for the disabled.30
The end of World War I brought another significant increase in the
number of veterans.  Nearly five million Americans fought in World
War I, 116,000 of whom died in service and 204,000 of whom were
wounded.31  After the war, Congress consolidated several separate
agencies into the Veterans Bureau in order to better accommodate the
growing numbers of veterans entering the benefits system.32  In 1930,
President Herbert Hoover finished the process of consolidation by
combining the remaining benefits agencies into the Veterans Adminis-
tration.33  The Veterans Administration was charged with providing
medical services, disability compensation, life insurance, bonus certifi-
cates, Army and Navy pensions, and retirement payments for both
military and civilian employees.34
After World War I, many veterans struggled to survive due to the
worsening economy.35  Congress attempted to help these veterans
24. Id. at 16–17.
25. Id. at 17.
26. VA HISTORY IN BRIEF, supra note 2, at 4.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Rory E. Riley, Preservation, Modification, or Transformation? The Current State
of the Department of Veterans Affairs Disability Benefits Adjudication Process
and Why Congress Should Modify, Rather Than Maintain or Completely Rede-
sign, the Current System, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 4 (2008).
30. Id. at 5.
31. VA HISTORY IN BRIEF, supra note 2, at 7.
32. Id. at 8.  These programs were the Bureau of War Risk Insurance, the Public
Health Service, and the Federal Board of Vocational Education. Id.
33. Id. at 12.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 9.
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weather severe financial hardship by passing the World War Adjust-
ment Compensation Act, which issued bonuses to World War I veter-
ans.36  However, for bonuses greater than $50, veterans were required
to wait twenty years from the time they were issued to redeem
them.37  In 1932, frustrated veterans marched in Washington, D.C. to
convince Congress to pay the bonuses sooner.38  The march turned vi-
olent when police officers tried to evict some veterans from the city,
and federal troops intervened, forcibly removing more than 3,500 vet-
erans who refused to leave the nation’s capital.39  Although the
marchers were unsuccessful in obtaining immediate payment of their
bonuses, Congress did eventually authorize payment four years later
in 1936.40  More importantly, however, the march highlighted the gov-
ernment’s failures in adequately caring for its veteran population.41
In addition to other external pressures, the march eventually led
Congress to pass what is known as the G.I. Bill of Rights, which was a
comprehensive benefits package for the sixteen million veterans try-
ing to reintegrate into society after World War II.42  A variety of other
post-World War II reforms, such as the creation of a separate depart-
ment of medicine and the beginning of outpatient treatment for veter-
ans with disabilities unrelated to military service, also drastically
improved the treatment veterans received.43  During this period, the
Veterans Administration itself grew exponentially, adding over 46,000
employees, thirteen branch offices, fourteen regional offices, and
twenty-nine new hospitals.44  This rapid expansion continued
throughout the Korean War, and was further bolstered by the 1952
passage of the Korean G.I. Bill, which provided unemployment insur-
ance, job placement, home loans, and other important benefits to
veterans.45
Due to the outbreak of the Vietnam War, which lasted for approxi-
mately two decades, the veteran population continued growing rap-
idly.46  Moreover, advances in battlefield airlift evacuation and
medical treatment meant a greater number of soldiers survived their
injuries than ever before.47  To support this influx of veterans, Con-
gress passed the Vietnam G.I. Bill in 1966, substantially increasing
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 9–11.
39. Id. at 10.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 13–14.
43. Id. at 15.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 16–17.
46. Id. at 18.
47. Id.
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educational benefits for veterans.48  During the post-Vietnam War pe-
riod, Congress also provided new forms of life insurance, created new
benefits outreach programs, and established special medical programs
to support those veterans suffering from illnesses caused by Agent Or-
ange.49  In 1979, Congress passed the Veterans Health Care Amend-
ments Act,50 which enabled the Veterans Administration to set up a
nationwide network of Vet Centers to provide crucial readjustment
counseling for veterans and their families.51
By the 1980s, the Veterans Administration had the largest budget
of any independent federal agency and the second-largest number of
employees.52  Indeed, a sizable one-third of the entire U.S. population
was eligible to receive veterans’ benefits.53  Given both the size and
importance of the Veterans Administration, in 1988, President Ronald
Reagan signed legislation elevating it to cabinet-level status, estab-
lishing what is now known as the Department of Veterans Affairs.54
B. Claims Adjudication: Establishing Judicial Review
Until 1988, there was no judicial recourse for veterans when the
government denied their benefits claims.55  Although President
Franklin Roosevelt established the Board of Veterans’ Appeals (the
Board) within the VA in 1933 to hear appeals of benefits decisions, if
the Board chose to deny a claim, veterans were afforded no indepen-
dent review of the Board’s decisions.56  Those seeking judicial review
of agency decision-making in other administrative agencies had the
right to appeal those decisions to an Article III court, but veterans
were denied that right.57  Thus, for over five decades, the Board pro-
vided veterans with the final decision on their benefits claims.58
Public pressure for judicial review of decisions on veterans’ bene-
fits claims mounted toward the end of the twentieth century, particu-
larly when an influx of post-Vietnam War claims in the 1970s and
48. Id.
49. Id. at 19–20. Agent Orange is an herbicide that was used extensively during the
Vietnam War to destroy the cover of enemy forces by defoliating trees. Id. at 20.
50. Pub. L. No. 96-22, 93 Stat. 47 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 38
U.S.C.).
51. VA HISTORY IN BRIEF, supra note 2, at 23.  A ful list of the services incorporated
in readjustment counseling can be found on the VA website. See Services, DEP’T
OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.vetcenter.va.gov/Vet_Center_Services.asp (last
visited January 28, 2011).
52. VA HISTORY IN BRIEF, supra note 2, at 26.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. History, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, www.uscourts.
cavc.gov/about/History.cfm (last visited May 5, 2010).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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1980s demonstrated that the claims adjudication process needed to be
reformed.59  Veterans and their advocacy groups urged Congress to
establish judicial review of VA decision-making.60  However, the
House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs resisted efforts to alter the VA’s
independence, instead maintaining what a committee report called
the VA’s “splendid isolation as the single federal administrative
agency whose major functions were explicitly insulated from judicial
review.”61  But after nearly three decades of debate, Congress finally
relented.  In 1988, it passed the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act (VJRA),
creating the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
(CAVC) under Article I of the Constitution and allowing appeals of
CAVC decisions to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, an Article III court.62
C. The Demographics of the Veteran Population
There is little doubt that one of our country’s most significant obli-
gations is to ensure that veterans receive exemplary medical care and
benefits and are supported with programs that improve their quality
of life when they return home from war.63  America currently has a
population of veterans numbering approximately 22.7 million, with an
additional 37 million spouses, children or other dependents, and survi-
vors of deceased veterans.64  Altogether, this constitutes about 20% of
the population of the United States.65  Approximately 3.1 million of
those veterans currently receive disability benefits from the VA.66
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. H.R. REP. NO. 100-963, at 10 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5791
(quoting Robert L. Rabin, Preclusion of Judicial Review in the Processing of
Claims for Veterans’ Benefits: A Preliminary Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 905, 905
(1975)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. Veterans Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105 (1988) (codi-
fied at 38 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)).
63. Sean E. Duggan, Veteran Demographics: Today’s Population, Tomorrow’s Projec-
tions, in SERVING AMERICA’S VETERANS, supra note 23, at 93.  The VA explains
that it “not only has a broad obligation, but also a moral imperative to provide
medical care to the men and women who have served our country.”  Veterans for
Common Sense v. Peake (VCS), 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2008), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d
845 (9th Cir. 2011).
64. Nat’l Ctr. for Veterans Analysis and Statistics, Veteran Population Projections:
FY2000 to FY2036, DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (Dec. 2010), available at http://
www.va.gov/VETDATA/docs/QuickFacts/population-slideshow.pdf; see Duggan,
supra note 63, at 94.
65. Duggan, supra note 63, at 94.
66. VA Benefits and Health Care Utilization, supra note 5.
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Overall, the number of veterans with service-connected disabilities
has risen 39% since 1990.67
The current veteran population already includes 1.3 million veter-
ans of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but this number is expected
to significantly increase once the service members currently in Iraq
and Afghanistan return to the United States.68  Nearly half of those
veterans have filed for benefits, but currently only 16% are receiving
them.69  As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan create new veterans, the
demands on the VA will increase significantly.70  Over 700,000 more
claims will likely be filed over the next ten years by these injured vet-
erans, if claim rates equal those of Gulf War veterans.71  For example,
nearly one-third of service members returning from Iraq seek mental
health care at the VA within a year of returning home.72  Moreover, as
medical treatments have improved, many service members are surviv-
ing battlefield injuries that might have been fatal in earlier conflicts,
leading to even more claims for disability benefits.73  Approximately
20% of Iraq War veterans have suffered traumatic brain or spinal cord
injuries, 20% live with an amputation, blindness, deafness, or a severe
burn injury, and 36% have been diagnosed with mental illness.74
D. Claims Processing at the Regional Office Level
The VA administers veterans’ benefits through its Veterans Bene-
fits Administration (VBA).  Within the VBA, the Compensation and
Pension Service (CPS) is responsible for administering “rating claims”
filed by injured veterans seeking compensation for a disability arising
67. Nat’l Ctr. for Veterans Analysis and Statistics, Trends in the Utilization of VA
Programs and Services, DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (Dec. 2010), http://www.
va.gov/VETDATA/docs/QuickFacts/utilization_slideshow.pdf.
68. Jerry Markon, ‘Veterans Court’ Faces A Backlog That Continues to Grow, WASH.
POST (Apr. 22, 2011), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ve
terans-court-faces-backlog-that-continues-to-grow/2011/04/15/AFFaavRE_story.
html.  This figure is current through April 2011. Id.
69. Id.
70. BD. ON MILITARY AND VETERANS HEALTH, INST. OF MEDICINE OF THE NAT’L ACADS.,
A 21ST CENTURY SYSTEM FOR EVALUATING VETERANS FOR DISABILITY BENEFITS 37
(Michael McGreary et al. eds., 2007).
71. JOSEPH E. SIGLITZ & LINDA J. BILMES, THE THREE TRILLION DOLLAR WAR: THE
TRUE COST OF THE IRAQ CONFLICT 78–79 (2008) (explaining that 45% of Gulf War
veterans filed for disability benefits).
72. Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake (VCS), 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1062 (N.D.
Cal. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Veterans for Common Sense v.
Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2011).
73. BD. ON MILITARY AND VETERANS HEALTH, supra note 70 (“The ratio of wounded to
killed in the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is 9.1 to 1, compared with 3.2
to 1 in Vietnam and 2.3 to 1 in World War II.”).
74. Brief for Appellants at 4, Viet. Veterans of Am. v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 654 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (No. 09-5260), 2009 WL 6931514.
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from an injury or disease they allege occurred during their service.75
Veterans can file these rating claims at any of the fifty-seven VA Re-
gional Offices around the country.
The purpose of rating claims is to determine whether a veteran has
a disability that qualifies for disability compensation.  Veterans must
satisfy three requirements in order to receive disability benefits: (1)
eligible service; (2) a currently diagnosed disability; and (3) a nexus
between the service and the disability.76  If a veteran establishes
these three elements, then the CPS assigns a percentage of disability
(1%–100%) based on a statutory rating schedule for how disabled a
veteran is in relation to the “average impairments of earning capacity
resulting from such injuries in civil occupations.”77  The rating as-
signed to a claim is based on a sliding scale of monthly compensation
currently ranging from $123 per month for a 10% rating to $2,673 per
month for a 100% rating.78  The number of veterans receiving ratings
of 50 to 100 percent is rising.79
The process for adjudicating rating claims is non-adversarial.  The
Veterans Claims Assistance Act (VCAA)80 established that the VA has
a “duty to assist” veterans throughout the initial claims process,
which means that the VA must help veterans develop the evidence to
support their claims.81  As such, once a veteran files a claim at a Re-
gional Office, the VCAA imposes a “duty to notify,” under which a
VBA employee—a Veterans Service Representative—must inform a
veteran of the evidence the VBA needs to adjudicate her claim.  As
part of this process, a Representative must delineate which evidence a
veteran must provide to the VBA and which evidence a Representa-
tive will seek on her behalf.82
Representatives are obligated to seek out all federal government
records relating to a veteran’s claim, including VA medical treatment
records and social security records, unless the Representative con-
75. 38 U.S.C. § 1155 (2006).  CPS also administers non-rating claims, claims for
which no disability rating is required. Non-rating claims include dependency
changes, claims for burial benefits, initial death pension claims for widows, and
adjustments to benefits due to incarceration.  Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 3
n.1, Viet. Veterans of Am. v. Peake, No. 08-1934 (RBW) (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2008).
76. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303 (2009).  Financial need, however, is not a factor. Id.
77. Id.
78. 38 U.S.C. § 1114 (2010); see also Disability Compensation Benefits, DEP’T OF VET-
ERANS AFFAIRS, http://www.vba.va.gov/VBA/benefits/factsheets/index.asp (last
visited July 8, 2011).
79. Trends in the Utilization, supra note 67.
80. 38 U.S.C. § 5103, 5103A.
81. 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.103(a), 3.159.  In addition, independent lawyers can represent vet-
erans throughout the initial claims adjudication process, but the VCAA dictates
that lawyers cannot be compensated for doing so.  38 U.S.C. §§ 5901–5904; 38
C.F.R. §§ 14.629–14.630.
82. See 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1).
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cludes that the records do not exist or that further efforts to obtain the
records would be futile.83  Representatives are also required to make
reasonable efforts to acquire non-federal records identified by a vet-
eran; usually this consists of private medical records.84  A Representa-
tive may also order a medical examination of a veteran to confirm that
a disability exists and to obtain information to help the VBA rate a
veteran’s disability on the rating scale.85
If the CPS grants a rating claim, the VBA issues a rating decision
and a notice informing the veteran of the percentage of disability
awarded.86  The notice also includes the date from which the veteran
is entitled to compensation, known as the “effective date.”87  In most
cases, the effective date is the date that a veteran filed a claim.88  If a
claim is denied, the VBA informs the veteran of its reasons for deny-
ing it.89
E. Appealing a Claim
1. Tiers of Review
A veteran dissatisfied with a rating decision has five available tiers
of review.90  The first tier is an initial appeal of the decision within the
VBA.  A veteran begins by filing a Notice of Disagreement (Notice),91
after which a veteran must wait until the Regional Office at which the
original claim was filed provides a Statement of the Case, which is a
more detailed explanation of the contested decision.  As of March
2008, the VA took an average of 261 days to provide a Statement of the
Case; however, some veterans have waited as long as 1,000 days.92
Once the Regional Office produces a Statement of the Case, a vet-
eran must file an appeal with the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which
takes an average of forty-three days to complete.93  These appeals are
commonplace; unsatisfied veterans appeal the VBA’s decisions on
about 11% of the approximately 830,000 ratings claims filed every
83. 38 U.S.C. § 5103A(c); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.159(c)(2), 3.159(c)(3).
84. 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(1).
85. Id. § 3.159(c)(4).
86. Id. § 3.303.
87. Id.
88. Id. §§ 3.323, 3.324.
89. 38 U.S.C. § 5104(b) (2006).
90. Miguel F. Eaton et al., Ten Federal Circuit Cases from 2009 that Veterans Bene-
fits Attorneys Should Know, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1155, 1161 (2009).  A veteran can
appeal any part of any issue in the rating decision: a denial of service connection,
the percentage disability assigned, or the effective date. Id.
91. Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake (VCS), 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1072 (N.D.
Cal. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Veterans for Common Sense v.
Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2011).
92. Id. at 1073.
93. Id.
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year.94  The Regional Office must then certify each appeal to the
Board.95  While this is a routine administrative task, it takes an aver-
age of 573 days, and sometimes as long as 1,000 days, for the Regional
Office to certify an appeal.96  After the Board receives the certified
appeal, it issues a decision, which takes an average of 336 days.97  In
all, it takes an average of 1,419 days from the time a veteran files a
Notice for the Board to complete an appeal.98
The Regional Offices have a dismal record on appeal.  The Board
reverses the Regional Offices outright approximately 20% of the time,
and it remands about 40% of appeals to the Regional Offices for fur-
ther adjudication.99  Of the cases remanded to the Regional Offices,
between 19% and 44% are deemed “avoidable remands”—appeals in
which the Regional Office makes an error before it certifies the appeal
to the Board.100  Nearly half of the avoidable remands that occurred
during the first three months of 2008 resulted from VBA employees
violating their duty to assist veterans.101  This may be due in part to
the fact that 70% of the VBA ratings specialists at Regional Offices
believe that their offices emphasize speed over accuracy in assigning
ratings.102
Once the Board remands a claim, it takes an average of 499 days
for the VBA to either grant it or return it to the Board for a second
time.103  The latter is the most frequent result; veterans appeal ap-
proximately 75% of remanded claims to the Board a second time.104  It
then takes the Board an average of 149 days to render a decision on
that re-appealed claim.105  In sum, from the time a veteran files an
initial claim with a Regional Office to the time the Board makes its
final decision, the average wait time is 4.4 years per decision.106
If a veteran is unsatisfied with the Board’s decision, her third tier
of review is the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC).107  The
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1074.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1075.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.  In addition, many veterans withdraw their claims during this time. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1075–76 (explaining that the average wait time includes 182 days for an
initial decision from the Regional Office and 1,419 days for a Board decision, but
excludes the time between a veteran’s Notice filing and a Regional Office’s initial
decision, which may be as long as one year).
107. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (2006).
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CAVC receives an average of 400 new cases every month,108 making it
one of the busiest federal appellate courts in the country.109  In fact,
the CAVC’s caseload has doubled in recent years, and in 2009, the
court decided 4,379 cases, some 3,270 of which were decisions on the
merits.110  All of this has occurred while three of the nine seats on the
court remain unfilled.111  The majority of appeals were meritorious; in
60% of its decisions, the court either remanded a claim to the Board or
reversed the Board outright.112
If a veteran remains unsatisfied with the outcome from the CAVC,
the veteran can appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.113  Lastly, a veteran’s fifth tier of available review is
to petition the United States Supreme Court for certiorari.114
2. Ever-Increasing Delays
i. Growing Dysfunctionality
To successfully appeal a claim at each tier of review, a veteran
faces numerous deadlines.115  If the veteran misses even one, the ap-
peal is considered to be forfeited.116  Ironically, the VA imposes no
deadlines on itself for administering the claims process, and it faces no
consequences if it takes an excessive amount of time to adjudicate a
claim.117  In fact, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has
found the VA’s system dysfunctional on four separate occasions, but
little has been done to address these concerns.  In 2000, prior to the
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the GAO found the long processing
times for initial disability claims and the large backlog of pending
claims unacceptable.118  The GAO reiterated these concerns in both
2003 and 2005, noting that fundamentally changing the VA’s disabil-
ity compensation programs had become a high priority because of the
108. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, ANNUAL REPORTS (2009) [here-
inafter CAVC ANNUAL REPORTS], available at http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/docu
ments/Annual_Report_FY_2009_October_1_2008_to_September_30_2009.pdf.
109. Markon, supra note 68.
110. CAVC ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 108; Markon, supra note 68 (noting that
“[j]udges are working nights and weekends but say they still have difficulty keep-
ing pace”).
111. Markon, supra note 68.
112. Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake (VCS), 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1075 (N.D.
Cal. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Veterans for Common Sense v.
Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2011).
113. 38 U.S.C. § 7292.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1254.
115. VCS, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 1073.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-00-65, VETERANS’ BENEFITS: PROMIS-
ING CLAIMS-PROCESSING PRACTICES NEED TO BE EVALUATED 3 (2000), available at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/he00065.pdf.
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“large numbers of pending claims and lengthy processing times.”119
Finally, in 2007, the GAO found the disability benefits program “in
urgent need of attention and transformation” because it was unable to
provide “meaningful and timely support for [veterans] with
disabilities.”120
The VA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has also identified
pervasive dysfunction and delay in the claims adjudication system.  A
recent OIG report concluded that as of August 2008, some 11,099 rat-
ing claims had been pending for an average of 1.3 years each.121  The
OIG also found that inefficient workload management at the Regional
Offices caused avoidable processing delays averaging 187 days for
90.5% of those delayed claims, estimating that “$14.4 million [in bene-
fits payments were] unnecessarily delayed by an average of 8 months
because of claims processing deficiencies.”122  In contrast, the private
health care and services industry, which handles thirty billion claims
annually, has an average claims processing time of under three
months, including the time necessary for appeals.123
The growing backlog of cases at all levels of the VA’s claims
processing system further exacerbates the delays and slows its
processing of new cases.  From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year
2006, the number of claims increased substantially each year,
amounting to an overall growth rate of almost 50%.124  As of May 1,
2010, some 523,976 rating claims were pending, 189,048 of which had
already been delayed for over 125 days.125  Thus, the present backlog
constitutes more than an entire year’s worth of cases.126
119. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-749T, Introduction to VETERANS’
DISABILITY BENEFITS: CLAIMS PROCESSING PROBLEMS PERSIST AND MAJOR PER-
FORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS MAY BE DIFFICULT (2005), available at http://www.
gao.gov/new.items/d05749t.pdf; see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-
1045, VETERANS’ BENEFITS: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN THE REPORTING AND USE
ON THE ACCURACY OF DISABILITY CLAIMS DECISIONS 11 (2003), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d031045.pdf.
120. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-562T, VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENE-
FITS: PROCESSING OF CLAIMS CONTINUES TO PRESENT CHALLENGES 7–8 (2007),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07562t.pdf.
121. Audit of VA Regional Office Rating Claims Processing Exceeding 365 Days, supra
note 11, at i.
122. Id.
123. Brief of Appellants at 7, Viet. Veterans of Am. v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (No. 09-5260), 2009 WL 6931514.
124. Id. at 9.  The number of claims rose from about 254,000 to 378,000. Id.
125. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 2010 Monday Morning Workload Reports (May 3,
2010), available at http://www.vba.va.gov/REPORTS/mmwr/2010/050310.xls.
126. BOARD OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, REPORT OF THE
CHAIRMAN: FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 2 (2008), available at http://www.bva.va.gov/
docs/Chairmans_Annual_Rpts/BVA2007AR.pdf.
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ii. Proposals for Reform
There have been several proposals for reforming the VA claims
processing system.  In 2004, Congress created the Veterans’ Disability
Benefits Commission, which from May 2005 to October 2007 con-
ducted an in-depth study of the benefits and services available to vet-
erans.127  The Commission issued a report containing extensive
recommendations it believes the VA should follow to guide the devel-
opment and delivery of benefits.128  Furthermore, in July 2007, the
President’s Commission on Care for America’s Returning Wounded
Warriors issued a report detailing a proposal for redesigning the cur-
rent VA and Department of Defense benefits systems.129  However,
none of these proposals has been adopted.
In fact, despite these proposals, the Director of Compensation and
Pension Services admitted in 2008 that the VA had not even tried to
determine the cause of the delays, nor had it made any effort to ad-
dress the problem of appellate delay.130  Instead, empirical data sug-
gests that the Board has responded to its ever-increasing caseload by
simply denying more claims on appeal.  Between fiscal years 2004 and
2007, the number of claims the Board denied nearly doubled,131 but
there is no evidence to support the notion that twice as many appealed
claims lacked merit in 2007 as they did in 2004.
In recent years, though, the VA has made some progress in begin-
ning to address the causes of the delays.132  Current VA Secretary
General Eric Shinseki has demonstrated a willingness to confront the
shortfalls of the VA claims adjudication process.133  At Shinseki’s con-
firmation hearing, he stated that he aspires to reduce the initial
claims processing time from six months to 145 days by 2015.134  Fur-
127. VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS COMM’N, HONORING THE CALL TO DUTY: VETERANS
DISABILITY BENEFITS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 1–3 (2007), available at http://www.
co.st-lawrence.ny.us/data/files/Departments/Veterans/VetDisBenefitComm9-27.
pdf.
128. Id. at 2–3.
129. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON CARE FOR AMERICA’S RETURNING WOUNDED WARRIORS:
SERVE, SUPPORT, SIMPLIFY (2007), available at http://www.veteransforamerica.
org/wp-content/uploads/2008/12/presidents-commission-on-care-for-americas-ret
urning-wounded-warriors-report-july-2007.pdf.
130. Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake (VCS), 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1073–74 (N.D.
Cal. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Veterans for Common Sense v.
Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2011).
131. BOARD OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, supra note 126, at 20.
132. See The Promise Audit: Tracking President Obama’s Progress on Campaign
Promises, NAT’L J., [hereinafter The Promise Audit] (listing articles enumerating
a variety of VA achievements) http://promises.nationaljournal.com/veterans/im-
prove-va-administrative-systems/ (last visited Nov. 31, 2010).
133. Id.
134. Id. When the VA asked VA employees and members of Veterans Service Organi-
zations for ideas on how to improve disability claims processing times, it received
3,000 responses in two months.  U.S Dept’t of Veterans Affairs, Craigslist
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ther, under Shinseki, the VA instituted a pilot program to test a
paperless claims processing system, and in October 2009, added four
judges to the Board.135  Notwithstanding these laudable goals, how-
ever, implementation is years away.  While reducing initial claims
processing times is a praiseworthy objective, the appellate delays
must be addressed immediately, because, as we explain in the next
Part, the delays violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE DELAY AND PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS
When Congress establishes government entitlement programs, the
administrative agencies charged with implementing them must follow
procedures that comply with the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, which guarantees that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”136  The due pro-
cess guarantee applies not only to an initial hearing but also through-
out an entire claims adjudication process, including appeals.137  As
such, when a court is faced with a claim of administrative delay under
the Due Process Clause, it must determine whether the government’s
action deprived an individual of “life, liberty, or property,” and if so,
evaluate whether the government provided sufficient process.138  In
this Part, we argue that a veteran alleging a service-connected disabil-
ity has a due process right to the fair adjudication of a claim for bene-
fits and that an average delay of 4.4 years clearly violates this right.
Founder Joins VA Innovation Search Panel (Nov. 4, 2009), available at http://
www1.va.gov/opa/pressrel/pressrelease.cfm?id=1808.
135. The Promise Audit, supra note 132.
136. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); see also
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49 (1950) (“The constitutional require-
ment of procedural due process of law derives from the same source as Congress’
power to legislate and, where applicable, permeates every valid enactment of that
body.”).
137. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985); Talamantes-Penalver v. INS, 51
F.3d 133, 135 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Once the right to appeal is created . . . the proce-
dures employed on appeal must provide . . . due process of law.” (citing Evitts, 469
U.S. at 393)); Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing United
States v. Antoine, 906 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir. 1990)); Burkett v. Cunningham,
826 F.2d 1208, 1221 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Codispoti v. Howard, 589 F.2d 135, 142
(3d Cir. 1978)); DeLancy v. Caldwell, 741 F.2d 1246, 1247 (10th Cir. 1984) (per
curiam) (citing United States v. Pratt, 645 F.2d 89, 91 (1st Cir. 1981)); Rheuark v.
Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 302 (5th Cir. 1980).
138. RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 744 (5th ed. 2010).
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A. The Right to Procedural Due Process
1. Background
The concept of due process embodies what Justice Felix Frank-
furter once eloquently described as “a system of rights based on moral
principles so deeply embedded in the traditions and feelings of our
people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived
by our whole history.”139  Supreme Court case law interpreting the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause has construed it as an inde-
pendent check on the exercise of the federal government’s power.140
The Clause imposes two types of limitations on government action—
139. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  The no-
tion of “due process of law” is deeply rooted in Western society; its origins can be
traced as far back as England’s thirteenth-century Magna Carta. FAITH THOMP-
SON, MAGNA CARTA: ITS ROLE IN THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION,
1300–1629, at 86–97 (1948).  The Magna Carta established that “[n]o freeman
shall be taken and imprisoned or disseized or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor
will we go upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment of his
peers and by the law of the land.” RHONDA WASSERMAN, PROCEDURAL DUE PRO-
CESS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 1–2 (2004);
Magna Carta art. XXXIX (1215) (emphasis added).  The phrase “by the law of
land” is considered a historical antecedent to the Constitution’s Due Process
Clause, as it assured both barons and freemen a trial by their peers, barred exe-
cution before judgment, and prohibited other types of arbitrary action by the
king. WASSERMAN, supra, at 1–2.  The colonists who arrived in America invoked
due process and the “law of the land” language from the Magna Carta during
their struggles with England prior to the Revolutionary War. Id. at 3.  During
the Constitutional Convention, several states became concerned that a stronger
federal government could interfere with the rights of individual citizens. Id. at 4.
They pushed for the Constitution to include a bill of rights that mentioned due
process rights but were unsuccessful. Id.  However, the ratification debates that
followed the Convention centered on the lack of a bill of rights, and as a result,
the framers reached a compromise wherein ratifying states could subsequently
submit a set of proposed amendments to the Constitution. Id. at 5.  Seven states
submitted proposals, four of which included the “law of the land” text from the
original Magna Carta. Id.  When the new Congress met in New York to consider
the Bill of Rights, James Madison offered his own set of proposed amendments,
one of which included King Edward’s “due process of law” phrase. Id.  That
phrase was eventually incorporated into the text of the Fifth Amendment, which
was adopted in 1791. Id. at 6; U.S. Const. amend. V.  As the Supreme Court
explained in 1855, “[t]he words, ‘due process of law,’ were undoubtedly intended
to convey the same meaning as the words, ‘by the law of the land,’ in Magna
Charta.” Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272, 276 (1855).  This understanding of the Due Process Clause is the one
that remains today.
140. See, e.g., Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332.  For a meditation on how the enactment of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and its subsequent interpreta-
tion have greatly affected the current understanding of the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause, see Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due
Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 500 (2010).
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substantive and procedural—that are often closely intertwined.141
Substantive due process requires that laws be fair and reasonable and
based on adequate justifications.142  Procedural due process, on the
other hand, requires that when the government deprives a person of
her life, liberty, or property, it must do so according to fair proce-
dures.143  A procedural due process challenge assumes that an en-
acted law is substantively valid, but asserts that the manner
employed to enforce or apply that law is unfair.144  Thus, claims that
the VA’s administrative delay violates veterans’ due process rights are
procedural; they do not dispute the validity of the law governing the
adjudication of their claims but allege instead that the VA’s conduct in
applying the law—conduct that results in years-long delays in adjudi-
cation—is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court’s framework for analyzing procedural due pro-
cess questions is to first ascertain whether there has been a depriva-
tion of life, liberty, or property, and if so, then to ask whether the
applied procedures “satisfy some normative conception of fairness.”145
In practice, procedural due process has proven to be a “flexible” con-
cept, “call[ing] for such procedural protections as the particular situa-
tion demands.”146  Therefore, when judges evaluate government
actions through the lens of the Due Process Clause, their analysis is
highly contextual, accounting for factors such as the time, place, and
circumstances of the challenged action.147  The touchstone of procedu-
141. Williams, supra note 140, at 417–18  (“Suffice it to say that actually in many
situations procedure and substance are so interwoven that rational separation
becomes well-nigh impossible.” (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541, 559 (1949) (Rutledge, J., dissenting))); see Walter Wheeler Cook, “Sub-
stance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 335–36 (1933)
(“[O]ur problem turns out to be not to discover the location of a pre-existing ‘line’
[between substance and procedure] but to decide where to draw a line.”).
142. ALLAN IDES & CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 54
(2d ed. 2001).
143. Id.; see Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 215–16
(2004) (“The idealization of a pure rule of procedure assumes that procedural
rules regulate the sphere of adjudicative institutions. Similarly, the idealization
of a pure rule of substance posits that the function of the substantive law is to
regulate primary conduct—the whole of human activity outside adjudicative
contexts.”).
144. IDES & MAY, supra note 142, at 159.
145. Williams, supra note 140, at 420–21; see also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The heart of
the matter is that democracy implies respect for the elementary rights of men,
however suspect or unworthy; a democratic government must therefore practice
fairness.”).
146. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
147. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (“ ‘[D]ue
process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed con-
tent unrelated to time, place, and circumstances.” (quoting McGrath, 341 U.S. at
162–63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring))).
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ral due process is notice and a fair opportunity to be heard,148 which
brings with it the right to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.”149
2. The Development of the Mathews Balancing Test
The most important contemporary doctrinal development in proce-
dural due process came in 1976, when the Supreme Court set forth a
balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge150 to facilitate the judicial de-
termination of whether government action comports with the require-
ments of the Due Process Clause.  In Mathews, the Social Security
Administration (SSA) canceled George Eldridge’s social security disa-
bility benefits without a pre-termination evidentiary hearing.151  In-
stead of seeking reconsideration of the SSA’s decision, Eldridge
challenged the constitutional validity of the administrative procedures
promulgated by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, ar-
guing that the Due Process Clause required the SSA to afford a recipi-
ent of disability benefits a pre-termination evidentiary hearing—an
assertion the Court rejected based upon what it considered to be the
limited utility of a pre-evidentiary hearing relative to its cost.152
In rejecting Eldridge’s claim, the Court established a test that
identifies constitutionally required procedures by conducting a cost-
benefit analysis that accounts for both the private and governmental
interests at stake in light of the value that increased safeguards would
offer.153  Thus, as the Mathews Court explained, to determine whether
a specific procedure complies with the Due Process Clause, a judge
must weigh the following three factors:
148. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); see
also N. Ala. Express, Inc. v. United States, 585 F.2d 783, 786 (5th Cir. 1978)
(“The due process clause requires that notice be reasonably calculated to inform
parties of proceedings which may directly and adversely affect their legally pro-
tected interests.  In the administrative context, due process requires that inter-
ested parties be given a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of adverse
parties and an opportunity to meet them.” (citations omitted)).
149. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); see also United Student Aid
Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1378 (2010) (“Due process requires no-
tice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested par-
ties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Mullane, 339 U.S.
at 313 (“Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of
the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they re-
quire that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by
notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.”); Gran-
nis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (“The fundamental requisite of due pro-
cess of law is the opportunity to be heard.”).
150. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
151. Id. at 323–24.
152. Id. at 324–26.
153. Id. at 348.
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First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substi-
tute procedural requirement would entail.154
Under this approach, called the “Mathews balancing test,” courts eval-
uate the adequacy of a particular procedure by weighing its impact on
an aggrieved individual against the burden that a change in the proce-
dure would likely impose on the government and the public.155  The
Court justified its use of a balancing test approach by reasoning that
“[a]t some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individ-
ual affected by the administrative action and to society in terms of
increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the
cost.”156
Although a balancing test approach has been used to evaluate the
limits of individual rights in a variety of contexts, the Mathews bal-
ancing test is unique in that it provides no minimum constitutional
floor for what process is due to an individual.157  Instead, as Profes-
sors Martin Redish and Lawrence Marshall explain, the Mathews
cost-benefit calculus emphasizes economic efficiency rather than fair-
ness by treating the government and individual interests as co-equal
determinants in assessing whether a constitutional right to a specific
procedure exists.158  This is a departure from traditional balancing
tests, which first establish a right and then place a burden on the gov-
ernment to prove that its interest outweighs that right.159
To highlight this point, let us consider the First Amendment’s Free
Speech Clause, which requires courts to balance an individual’s right
to free speech against the government’s interest in limiting that
speech.160  To conclude that the government’s interest overrides an
individual’s right to free speech in this context, a court must first
subordinate an individual’s constitutional right to a government objec-
tive.161  Because courts are sensitive to overriding the Constitution,
154. Id. at 335 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263–71 (1970)).
155. Id. at 334–35; see 32 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., JUDICIAL
REVIEW § 8129, at 82 (2005) (noting that “the cornerstone for all analysis of proce-
dural adequacy has become Justice Powell’s opinion in Mathews v. Eldridge”).
156. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348.
157. See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and
the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 472–73 (1986).
158. Id. at 473.
159. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982) (addressing the right to
free exercise of religion); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (addressing the
right to free speech and free exercise of religion); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (addressing the right to free exercise of religion); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958) (addressing the right to freedom of association).
160. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269–70.
161. Redish & Marshall, supra note 157, at 473.
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they may be less willing to legitimize governmental incursions on es-
tablished rights.162  But the Mathews test lacks this traditional dy-
namic, thereby relieving courts of the burden of finding that a
governmental interest overrides a clear constitutional right.163  As a
result, the deck is stacked in favor of the government; as Redish and
Marshall note, “it is likely that the Court’s balancing test, lacking any
minimum floor of procedural protection, will generally find in favor of
the governmental interest.”164  And yet, despite this quixotic ap-
proach, judges have applied the Mathews balancing test in a variety of
circumstances to find violations of procedural due process.
3. Administrative Delay as a Violation of Procedural Due
Process
The due process guarantee applies not only to an initial hearing
before an administrative agency, but also throughout an entire claims
adjudication process, including appeals.165  This is because, as Judge
Richard Posner explains, “implicit in the conferral of an entitlement is
a further entitlement, to receive the entitlement within a reasonable
time.”166  To be sure, delay is only one of many factors courts consider,
but it is nonetheless a “significant factor” in determining the constitu-
tionality of administrative procedures.167  In fact, claims processing
delays can become so unreasonable that they alone deny a claimant
her due process rights, leading courts to declare them
unconstitutional.168
162. Id.  For another criticism of the Mathews test, see Charles H. Koch, Jr., A Com-
munity of Interest in the Due Process Calculus, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 635, 643–44
(2000) (“The deeper source of disquiet is the tendency of Mathews analysis to set
state interests against those of the individual.  The perceived juxtaposition of
these two categories of interests has long been a part of due process jurispru-
dence. . . . As applied, this utilitarian balancing invariably pits the benefit to the
individual against the cost to the community. Yet process has costs as well as
benefits for the individual and benefits as well as costs for the overall system.”).
163. Redish & Marshall, supra note 157, at 473.
164. Id.
165. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393 (1985); accord Talamantes-Penalver v.
INS, 51 F.3d 133, 135 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Once the right to appeal is created . . . the
procedures employed on appeal must provide plaintiffs with due process of law.”
(citing Evitts, 469 U.S. at 393)); Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528, 530 (9th Cir.
1990) (citing United States v. Antoine, 906 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir. 1990)); Bur-
kett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1221 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Codispoti Y-1353
v. Howard, 589 F.2d 135, 142 (3d Cir. 1978)); DeLancy v. Caldwell, 741 F.2d
1246, 1247 (10th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Pratt, 645 F.2d
89, 91 (1st Cir. 1981) and Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 302 (5th Cir. 1980)).
166. Schroeder v. City of Chicago, 927 F.2d 957, 960 (7th Cir. 1991).
167. Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th Cir. 1978).
168. See, e.g., Kraebel v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 959 F.2d 395, 405 (2d Cir.
1992) (“[D]elay in processing can become so unreasonable as to deny due pro-
cess.”); Kelly v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 490 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding that the
Railroad Retirement Board’s administrative appeals process violated due process
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In practice, there is no bright-line definition of the amount of time
that constitutes an excessive delay; indeed, courts have held that a
variety of delay lengths violate due process.  For example, in Kelly v.
Railroad Retirement Board, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that a three-year-and-nine-month delay in the Railroad
Retirement Board’s disability benefits appeals process violated the re-
cipient’s due process rights.169  The court reasoned that although
“there is no magic length of time after which due process requirements
are violated,” it was “certain that three years, nine months, is well
past any reasonable time limit, when no valid reason for the delay is
given.”170  Thus, it concluded that “[a] situation such as this, where
the administrative review process of a single disability application ex-
tended to nearly four years, is wholly inexcusable.”171
Similarly, in White v. Mathews, the Second Circuit found that
211.8-day glacial delays in the social security disability appeals pro-
cess were so unreasonable that they violated the Due Process
Clause.172  The court reasoned that since a “disability insurance pro-
gram is designed to alleviate the immediate and often severe hard-
ships that result from a wage-earner’s disability,” the lengthy delays
“detract[ed] seriously from the effectiveness of the program.”173  Thus,
even after considering the “serious problems with which the SSA has
had to cope,” and moreover, that “the SSA had, commendably, tried to
overcome them,”174 the court found that the delays were unjustified.
It concluded that “[w]hen the government does not act with reasona-
ble promptness, those claiming total disability are required to bear an
unreasonable delay and suffer unwarranted deprivation of that which
is lawfully theirs.”175
for producing inordinate delays); White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252, 1261 (D.
Conn. 1976) (“The Court finds that the lengthy and persistent delays experienced
. . . averaging 211.8 days . . . are unreasonable.  Such delay denies due process
rights.”), aff’d 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977).
169. Kelly, 625 F.2d at 490.
170. Id. at 490.
171. Id.
172. 559 F.2d 852, 859 (2d Cir. 1977).
173. Id. at 858 (“Perhaps this unfortunate impact might be diminished to a tolerable
level if a high percentage of claimants seeking hearings before an administrative
law judge were not actually entitled to benefits.  But such hearings have led to
reversals in more than half the cases heard.”).
174. Id. at 859 (citing White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252, 1261 (D. Conn. 1977),
aff’d 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977)).
175. See infra section IV.B for a discussion of the remedy the White court imposed.  In
another Second Circuit case, Kraebel v. New York City Department of Housing
Preservation & Development, 959 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1992), the court found that
when the city delayed for eighteen months in making a determination as to
whether a landlord was entitled to property tax benefits, the city may have vio-
lated the landlord’s due process rights. Id. at 405–06 (“[W]e are not prepared to
conclude, without further evidence, that the delays here are reasonable.  Al-
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-2\NEB205.txt unknown Seq: 24  6-DEC-11 14:58
2011] VETERANS’ BENEFITS AND DUE PROCESS 411
And yet, while procedural due process case law makes clear that
courts are willing to hold lengthy delays unconstitutional, it also dem-
onstrates that not every delay in the administrative review process
offends the Constitution or demands a judicial response.  For example,
the Fifth Circuit found that a twenty-day delay in the receipt of one
monthly welfare check did not deny due process because the delay oc-
curred during the agency’s review for program eligibility, which was
necessary to the government’s interest in preventing undeserving re-
cipients from receiving entitlements.176  The Third Circuit found that
a nine-month delay between a recommended decision and a final deci-
sion in a social security benefits case was constitutional, in light of the
volume of cases before the body handling final decisions.177  And the
Second Circuit found that a nineteen-month delay in Medicare reim-
bursements of claims under $500 was justified because the small
amount of benefits unrelated to financial need meant the private in-
terest was low, the court had no information about the risk of errone-
ous deprivation, and the government had a substantial interest in
resolving claims by private hearing officers.178
As these cases demonstrate, courts can be reticent to interfere with
administrative procedures on constitutional grounds, and such action
is not taken lightly.179  But while courts may be hesitant to inject
themselves into the administrative process—and although they may
reach differing conclusions on where the line between undesirable and
unconstitutional delay should be drawn—it is indisputable that such a
line exists.  As we explain in the next section, if the concept of proce-
dural due process is to have any meaning at all, then judges must hold
though no bright-line rule exists for determining when a delay is so burdensome
as to become unconstitutional, we think that there is at least a question of fact as
to whether these delays were egregious and without any rational justification.”).
The court explained that “even before the state makes a definitive decision as to
entitlement, the road to that determination must be paved by due process.” Id. at
405.  Highlighting the “case-by-case approach required in due process cases,” the
court remanded for the district court to consider whether the delay was justified,
weighing the landlord’s interest in prompt payment against the city’s difficulty in
making eligibility determinations. Id. at 405–06.
176. Barrett v. Roberts, 551 F.2d 662 (5th Cir. 1977).
177. Littlefield v. Heckler, 824 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1987).
178. Isaacs v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1989).
179. See Redish & Marshall, supra note 157, at 473.  For example, in Wright v.
Califano, the Seventh Circuit reversed an Illinois district court’s order that the
SSA provide hearings and appeals within specified time limits or make
mandatory interim payments of benefits until the SSA reached a final decision.
587 F.2d 345, 346–47 (7th Cir. 1978).  The court found that the 180-day delay in
the SSA’s review process did not, under the circumstances, amount to a due pro-
cess violation. Id. at 354.  Even so, however, the court acknowledged that “unjus-
tified and unreasonable administrative delays constituting a deprivation of
property in violation of due process” could require judicial intervention in the
future.  Id. at 356.
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that the 4.4-year average delays within the VA claims adjudication
system are unconstitutional.
B. Delay at the VA as a Violation of Procedural Due Process
1. Veterans’ Benefits as a Property Interest
As enumerated in the Fifth Amendment, the Due Process Clause
applies to deprivations of “property.”180  Statutory entitlements such
as food stamps,181 welfare benefits,182 and veterans’ benefits183 qual-
ify as property and are therefore entitled to due process protec-
tions.184 Further, although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed
whether claimants possess a property interest in their applications for
benefits, over half of the federal circuit courts of appeals that have
addressed that question have answered in the affirmative.185
For example, in Cushman v. Shinseki, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit—the intermediary appellate court
with jurisdiction over individual veterans’ appeals—explicitly held
that a veteran applying for disability benefits whose right to those dis-
ability benefits had not yet been established possessed a constitution-
ally protected property interest in the fair adjudication of his claim.186
In Cushman, the plaintiff was a Vietnam War veteran whose medical
records had been improperly altered by the government to understate
his disability and thus limit his access to disability benefits.187  He
argued that by considering the altered document, the government in-
fringed upon his constitutional right to a fair adjudication of his enti-
180. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
181. See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128 (1985) (holding that food stamps are a
form of property protected by the Due Process Clause).
182. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1970) (holding that welfare benefits
are a form of property protected by the Due Process Clause).
183. See Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that vet-
erans’ benefits are a form of property protected by the Due Process Clause).
184. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262–63.
185. Kapps v. Wing, 404 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that “applicants for ben-
efits, no less than current benefits recipients, may possess a property interest in
the receipt of public welfare entitlements”); Hamby v. Neel, 368 F.3d 549, 557–59
(6th Cir. 2004) (involving an applicant for Medicaid benefits); Mallette v. Arling-
ton Cnty. Emps. Supplemental Ret. Sys. II, 91 F.3d 630, 637–40 (4th Cir. 1996)
(involving an applicant for retirement benefits); Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d
1197, 1203 (9th Cir. 1990) (involving an applicant for social security benefits);
Daniels v. Woodbury Cnty., 742 F.2d 1128, 1132–33 (8th Cir. 1984) (involving
applicants for welfare benefits); Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1214–15 (9th
Cir. 1982) (involving an applicant for federal rent subsidies); Kelly v. R.R. Ret.
Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489–91 (3d Cir. 1980) (involving an applicant for a disabled
child’s annuity); Griffeth v. Detrich, 603 F.2d 118, 121–22 (9th Cir. 1979) (involv-
ing an applicant for welfare benefits); Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 354 (7th
Cir. 1978) (involving an applicant for social security benefits).
186. Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1292.
187. Id. at 1294.
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tlement claim.188  The Federal Circuit agreed, reasoning that a
veteran’s entitlement to non-discretionary disability benefits is a
property interest protected by the Due Process Clause:
[Veterans’] disability benefits are nondiscretionary, statutorily mandated ben-
efits.  A veteran is entitled to disability benefits upon a showing that he meets
the eligibility requirements set forth in the governing statutes and regula-
tions.  We conclude that such entitlement to benefits is a property interest
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.189
Thus, Cushman stands for the proposition that a veteran forced into
the hamster wheel of the VA claims processing system has a Fifth
Amendment right to a fair resolution of his application for benefits.
Given that due process rights attach from the moment a veteran files
a claim and continue until the veteran exhausts the final appeal, the
only question that remains is whether the delays discussed in section
II.E rise to the level of a due process violation—which, as we demon-
strate through a Mathews balancing test analysis, they undoubtedly
do.190
2. The Delays’ Impact on Veterans’ Essential and Basic Needs
Under the first prong of the Mathews balancing test, a court must
evaluate “the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion”191 by “examin[ing] the importance of the private interest and the
harm to this interest occasioned by delay.”192  With regard to veter-
188. Id. at 1292.
189. Id. at 1298.
190. On May 10, 2011, the Ninth Circuit held that the 4.4-year delays within the VA’s
claims adjudication process was in fact a violation of veterans’ right to procedural
due process.  Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845, 878–79 (9th
Cir. 2011) (holding that the “entitlement to service-connected death and disabil-
ity compensation is a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause, and
that the lack of adequate procedures to prevent undue delay in the provision of
that property constitutes a deprivation that violates [v]eterans’s [sic] constitu-
tional rights”).  Due to this violation, the Ninth Circuit remanded for the district
court to “either approve an agreement reached by the parties or enter an appro-
priate order instructing the VBA to provide [v]eterans with the procedural safe-
guards to which they are entitled.” Id. at 878.  At the time the Ninth Circuit
opinion was released, this Article was already in a late stage of the publication
process.  The Mathews analysis conducted by the Ninth Circuit supports the con-
clusion reached in this Article. See infra section IV.B. But see Viet. Veterans of
Am. v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 654, 662 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 195
(2010) (dismissing a similar lawsuit by finding that the plaintiff veterans organi-
zation lacked standing to challenge the delays because they used “average
processing time” to assert their injury, which the court concluded did not “cause”
their injury).
191. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
192. FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 242 (1988).  Indeed, in Mallen, the Court rearticu-
lated the Mathews test, stating that in assessing whether an administrative
agency has violated a person’s due process rights, “it is appropriate to examine
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ans’ disability benefits, the private interest—the timely adjudication
of a veteran’s claim—is vital. Because disability benefits compensate a
veteran for an average impairment in earning capacity,193 delays in
the claims adjudication process can place disabled veterans’ economic
survival at risk.  This weighs heavily in favor of veterans, since as the
Supreme Court noted in Goldberg v. Kelly, whether an “eligible recipi-
ent [may be deprived] of the very means by which to live while he
waits” is a “crucial factor” in the due process analysis.194
Indeed, the importance of veterans’ benefits cannot be under-
stated.  Many veterans are primarily or fully dependent on these bene-
fits for financial support because their disabilities often prevent them
from becoming employed.195  As a result of this dependence, and due
to the fact that veterans receive no money from the VA until their
claims are approved, many applicants have no viable means of finan-
cial support during the average of 4.4 years it takes to appeal an ini-
tial denial.  This can reduce a disabled veteran’s ability to buy food
and clothing and to make mortgage payments, causing significant psy-
chological stress that can lead to marital and family difficulties,196 do-
mestic violence,197 divorce,198 and even suicide.199  In fact, an average
of eighteen veterans commit suicide each day200—a rate that is eight
times the national average.201
The overall harm caused by the delay is exacerbated because a sig-
nificant portion of veterans applying for disability benefits already
suffer from severe mental health problems, such as PTSD.202  This
additional harm manifests itself in two ways.  First, veterans suffer-
the importance of the private interest and the harm to this interest occasioned by
delay; the justification offered by the Government for delay and its relation to the
underlying governmental interest; and the likelihood that the interim decision
may have been mistaken.” Id. at 242.  Courts assessing the constitutionality of
an administrative agency’s procedures have used this test to guide their balanc-
ing. See, e.g., Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845, 884 (9th
Cir. 2011) (using the Mallen test to determine whether process is “past due”).
193. Bilmes, supra note 6, at 6.
194. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (emphasis omitted).
195. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters, 589 F. Supp. 1302, 1314 (N.D. Cal.
1984).
196. INVISIBLE WOUNDS, supra note 15, at 141–48.
197. Id. at 143–44.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 128–31.
200. Katharine Euphrat, 22,000 Vets Called Suicide Hot Line in a Year, ARMYTIMES
(July 28, 2008), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2008/07/ap_suicide_hotline_072
808/.
201. Kara Zivin et al., Suicide Mortality Among Individuals Receiving Treatment for
Depression in the Veterans Affairs Health System: Associations with Patient and
Treatment Setting Characteristics, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2193, 2195 (2007),
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2089109/pdf/0972193.
pdf.
202. Id. at 2193.
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ing from PTSD experience increased anxiety in response to perceived
hostile events, so the psychological impact of waging a nearly five-year
legal battle with the VA can be particularly profound.203  Second, the
delays can also prevent veterans with PTSD from getting the treat-
ment they need in the first place.  Due to the VA’s well-documented
failure to diagnose PTSD,204 veterans with PTSD are often improperly
denied access to VA medical assistance, presumably leaving them to
seek costly private medical and psychological treatment.  But for those
veterans dependent upon disability benefits to pay for that private
health care, the lengthy delays could cause them to delay treatment
until their appeals are completed.  This lack of treatment, in turn, can
lead to a whole host of problems, including the development of other
psychiatric disorders, higher rates of physical health problems, higher
rates of unhealthy behaviors, a greater likelihood of being unem-
ployed, and relationship and parenting problems.205
In short, the VA’s delays severely affect the lives of America’s vet-
erans.  Furthermore, as we explain in the next section, the risk of er-
roneous deprivation is high, and only grows as the length of the delays
increases.
3. VA Delays as an Erroneous Deprivation of Property
The second Mathews factor requires a court to evaluate “the risk of
an erroneous deprivation” of benefits,206 and therefore, to assess “the
203. INVISIBLE WOUNDS, supra note 15, at 144.
204. See, e.g., Allen G. Breed, In Tide of New PTSD Cases, Fear of Growing Fraud,
SEATTLE TIMES (May 1, 2010), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/na-
tionworld/2011753743_apusthewarwithinfakeclaims.html; Judith Graham, VA
Psychologist to Staff: Don’t Diagnose PTSD, CHI. TRIB. (May 16, 2008), http://
newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/triage/2008/05/va-psychologist.html; see also Pia
Malbran, VA Staffer Discourages PTSD Diagnoses, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/05/15/cbsnews_investigates/main4102226.
shtml (discussing an internal VA e-mail discouraging mental health professionals
from diagnosing veterans with PTSD); Judge May Reopen Case Against VA After
PTSD Email Emerges, PUBLIC RECORD (June 9, 2008), http://pubrecord.org/law/
522/judge-may-reopen-case-against-va-after-ptsd-email-emerges/ (discussing
multiple email correspondences within different VA offices that suggest “a pat-
tern to downplay the rising number of PTSD cases”).
205. INVISIBLE WOUNDS, supra note 15, at 437 (explaining that veterans suffering from
PTSD are “likely to have other psychiatric problems (e.g., substance use) and to
attempt suicide . . . [and are] more likely to have higher rates of unhealthy behav-
iors (e.g., smoking, overeating, unsafe sex); higher rates of physical health
problems and mortality; a tendency to miss more days of work and report being
less productive while at work; and a greater likelihood of being unemployed.  Suf-
fering from these conditions can also impair personal relationships, disrupt mar-
riages, aggravate difficulties with parenting, and cause problems in children that
extend the costs of combat experiences across generations.  There is also a possi-
ble connection between having one of these conditions and being homeless”).
206. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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likelihood that the interim decision [prior to appeal] may have been
mistaken.”207  This factor requires a judge to evaluate the overall ac-
curacy of the process afforded to an individual by an agency.208  With
regard to the VA’s appellate process, the risk of erroneous deprivation
is high, given the poor accuracy rate of the claims adjudicators.
Consider the following statistics.  After years of waiting, the Board
grants a veteran’s appeal outright 20% of the time and remands it
40% of the time;209 in other words, Regional Offices are likely to make
mistakes on the majority of claims with which they are tasked.210
Furthermore, nearly half of avoidable remands result from VA em-
ployees violating their duty to assist veterans.211  Most distressingly,
approximately 75% of the rating claims that the Board remands are
subsequently appealed to the Board a second time.212
This poor accuracy rate is unsurprising, however, given that 70%
of VA ratings specialists believe that the VA emphasizes speed over
accuracy in the claims adjudication process.213  Further, the longer a
decision on a veteran’s disability benefits claim is delayed, the more
likely it is that substantial mistakes will be made in the claims adjudi-
cation process, thereby further increasing the likelihood of erroneous
deprivation.214  This is because delays increase the likelihood that Re-
207. FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 228, 242 (1988).
208. Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975) (noting that “the rapidity of admin-
istrative review is a significant factor in assessing the sufficiency of the entire
process”).
209. Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake (VCS), 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1075 (N.D.
Cal. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Veterans for Common Sense v.
Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2011).
210. See also Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 664 F.3d 845, 885 n.37 (9th Cir.
2011) (alterations in the original) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at *52,
Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. 2521 (U.S. 2010) (No. 08-1322) 2010 WL 603696). The
court in Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki cites the following exchange from
a recent Supreme Court oral argument:
[Assistant to the Solicitor General Anthony] YANG: [The reversal rate in
the VA context is] in the order of either 50 or maybe slightly more than
50 percent. It might be 60. But the number is substantial that you get a
reversal . . . .
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, that’s really startling, isn’t it? In liti-
gating with veterans, the government more often than not takes a posi-
tion that is substantially unjustified?
MR. YANG: It is an unfortunate number, Your Honor. And it is—it’s
accurate.
Id.
211. VCS, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Since it is unquestionable that a substantial portion of remands have merit,
meaning a Regional Office inappropriately denied a claim, there is little doubt
that procedural reforms that require claims to be adjudicated in a timelier fash-
ion would be of great value to veterans who have been erroneously deprived of
their benefits. See id.  Indeed, whereas the Mathews Court was skeptical that the
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gional Offices will lose, misplace, or otherwise destroy vital evidence
and files pertaining to veterans’ claims.215  For example, a recent na-
tional review of the Regional Offices found that the VA had slated
nearly five hundred benefits claims records for destruction.216  Simi-
larly, during a routine audit, the VA’s Office of Inspector General dis-
covered that 132 documents that were needed to support and facilitate
claims processing had instead been inappropriately discarded in
shredding bins at four Regional Offices.217  After the OIG informed
the VA of its findings, the VA discovered that 474 additional claims-
related documents had been inappropriately discarded in forty-one of
the fifty-eight Regional Offices.218  If a single audit revealed such sig-
nificant levels of document destruction, one can only imagine the ac-
tual scope of this problem.
Thus, given the high rate of mistakes at the Regional Office level—
and the remands and document destruction that accompany those
mistakes—the risk of erroneous deprivation is high.  With this in
mind, we now examine the third Mathews factor: the government’s
interest in maintaining the status quo.
4. The Government’s Interest Substantially Aligns with
Veterans’ Interests
The final factor under the Mathews balancing test requires a court
to evaluate the government’s interest in preserving the procedures
currently utilized by the VA.219  Specifically, this factor focuses the
full evidentiary hearing requested would substantially increase the accuracy of
the administrative process at the SSA, it is certain that the expedition of the VA
claims adjudication process would be of direct, substantial value to veterans. See
Andrew Lloyd Merritt, Judicial Resolution of Systemic Delays in Social Security
Hearings, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 976–77 (1979).
215. Yvonne Miller-Halee, Veterans’ Claims Found in Shredder Bins, CBS NEWS (Feb.
11, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/10/16/cbsnews_investigates/
main4527134.shtml.
216. Amanda Ruggeri, Military Veterans’ Benefit Claims Records Wrongly Headed for
VA Shredders, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 31, 2008), http://www.usnews.com/
articles/news/national/2008/10/31/military-veterans-benefit-claims-records-wron
gly-headed-for-va-shredders.html.
217. Document Tampering and Mishandling at the U.S. Department of Veterans Af-
fairs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance & Memorial Affairs
and the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Veteran’s
Affairs, 111th Cong. 55 (2009) (statement of Belinda J. Finn, Assistant Inspector
General for Auditing, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg48418/pdf/
CHRG-111hhrg48418.pdf.
218. Id.
219. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see also FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S.
228, 242 (1988) (explaining that this factor should assess “the justification offered
by the Government for delay and its relation to the underlying governmental
interest”).
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due process analysis on the range of government or community inter-
ests underlying the government program.220  It is important to point
out, however, that the government or community interest analyzed
under the third Mathews fact “is not conceptually adverse to the indi-
viduals [sic] interest.”221  Thus, as the Supreme Court explained in
Goldberg v. Kelly, the “same governmental interests that counsel the
provision of welfare, counsel as well its uninterrupted provision to
those eligible to receive it.”222  Therefore, given the moral and legal
obligation of the government to veterans, the government’s interest in
the timely and accurate dispensation of veterans’ disability benefits
largely reflects a veteran’s personal interest in receiving them.
But the scope of the government’s interest in the timely dispensa-
tion of veterans’ benefits extends further than simply mirroring a vet-
eran’s personal interest.  There are also national security
implications.  Veterans’ benefits provide an important incentive to
those considering whether to join the Armed Forces—an incentive
that is particularly relevant at a time when enlistment levels are low
but need is high.223  One way to incentivize enlistment is to demon-
strate a strong record of care for veterans, in which veterans’ benefits,
and more specifically, timely adjudication of benefits claims, play a
central role.  The VA’s inability to carry out its mission to care for dis-
abled veterans is currently a frequent topic in the media, and it has
generated a sense of societal resentment and anger among both veter-
ans and the general public.224  In fact, a 2010 poll found that 94% of
veterans do not trust the VA to handle their compensation claims
fairly.225  These conditions could create an environment in which po-
tential recruits might no longer see the armed services as a viable
option.
And yet, while the government has a clear interest in shortening
the delays, that interest must be balanced by its interest—and the
220. WRIGHT & KOCH, supra note 155, § 8129, at 88.
221. Id.
222. 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970).
223. See Reality: Military Repeatedly Fails to Meet Recruiting Goals, VETERANS FOR
COMMON SENSE (Jan. 2, 2010, 21:21), http://www.veteransforcommonsense.org/
index.php/national-security/1549-vcs (explaining that “the military [has] failed to
reach new enlistment goals for the past decade”).
224. Jason Grotto & Tim Jones, VA Laboring Under Surge of Wounded, CHI. TRIB.
(Apr. 11, 2010), http://www.chicagotribune.com/health/ct-met-disabled-veterans-
cost-20100409,0,5841974.story (discussing the VA’s claims backlog and veterans’
reactions); Peter Katel, Caring for Veterans, 20 CQ RESEARCHER 16, Apr. 23,
2010, at 361 (giving examples of individual veteran’s feelings toward the system
while highlighting the overall problem).
225. 94% of Veterans Do Not Trust Their VA Compensation Claim Will Be Handled
Fairly by the VA, PR WEB (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.prweb.com/releases/2010_
VA_disability_lawyer/02_poll/prweb3645864.htm.
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taxpayers’ interest—in controlling the cost of government.226  Because
government resources are limited, “[a]t some point the benefit of an
additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative
action and to society in terms of increased assurance that the action is
just, may be outweighed by the cost.”227  However, while reducing de-
lay times would undoubtedly require the expenditure of government
resources, it does not appear that a lack of funding or staffing
shortages are constraining the VA from ameliorating the delays.228
Since 2008, the VA’s overall budget has increased substantially, grow-
ing by 16% for fiscal year 2010—the largest increase in 30 years.229
Further, the proposed 2011 Department of Veterans Affairs budget in-
cluded an “unprecedented” 27% increase in funding for the Veterans
Benefit Administration.230
Most importantly, however, the VA “is not without weapons to min-
imize [the] increased costs” associated with reducing its delays.231
Seventy percent of rating specialists believe the VA emphasizes speed
over accuracy.232  In fact, between 19% and 44% of remands were
“avoidable,” and almost half of the avoidable remands were caused by
the failure to assist veterans in developing their claims and support-
ing evidence.233  And when the Board remands a claim, it adds an av-
erage of 688 days—nearly two years—to the delay a veteran faces in
obtaining a determination on her benefits appeal.234  Reforming this
226. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 335, 348 (1976) (“Financial cost alone is not a
controlling weight in determining whether due process requires a particular pro-
cedural safeguard prior to some administrative decision. But the Government’s
interest, and hence that of the public, in conserving scarce fiscal and administra-
tive resources is a factor that must be weighed.”).
227. Id.
228. See Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845, 885 (9th Cir. 2011)
(explaining that the VA has not pointed to a lack of resources as preventing it
from remedying the delays).
229. Kara Rowland, Vets Salute Obama on Funding, WASHINGTON TIMES (April 29,
2010), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/29/vets-salute-obama-on-
funding/.  Obama’s proposed VA budget for 2011 asks for $125 billion for the
agency, a 10% increase from 2010. Id.
230. Rick Maze, VA Claims Expected to Take Longer in 2011, ARMYTIMES (Feb. 2,
2010), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/02/military_vaclaims_2011_020210
w/.
231. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970) (explaining that “[m]uch of the drain
on fiscal and administrative resources can be reduced by developing procedures
for prompt . . . hearings and by skillful use of personnel and facilities”).
232. Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake (VCS), 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1075 (N.D.
Cal. 2008) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Veterans for Common Sense v.
Shinseki, 644 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2011).
233. Id.
234. This includes 499 days for the VBA to grant the second appeal or return it to the
Board for a second time, and 149 days for the Board to issue a second decision.
VCS, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
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poorly structured incentive system might enable the VA to shorten its
delay time without incurring substantial costs.235
But whatever the ultimate cost of reforming the VA’s claims adju-
dication process, it must nonetheless give way to veterans’ interest in
the timely adjudication of their benefits claims.  Both the individual
and community interests at stake in ensuring that the government
fulfills its legal obligation to furnish veterans’ benefits according to
fair procedures outweigh the cost of  doing so.  For as the district court
in White v. Mathews noted, “the question is not whether there shall be
costs incurred, but who shall bear them while the governmental ma-
chinery responsible for providing appeals puts itself in order.”236
Thus, given that the VA is violating veterans’ due process rights, we
explain in the next Part how Article III courts can remedy these
violations.
IV. THE NEED FOR A JUDICIAL REMEDY
Federal courts are empowered to declare what the Constitution re-
quires and to provide a remedy when government action exceeds the
bounds of constitutionally permissible process.237 Although the co-
equal branches of government are entitled to discretion in how they
conduct their internal affairs238—and enforcement of the nation’s
laws is the province of the executive branch—the Constitution does
not provide the executive branch with discretion to violate constitu-
tional rights.239  In the context of agency action, courts have a particu-
larly important role to play in safeguarding these rights, given that
235. See, e.g., Is VBA’s Systematic Technical Accuracy Review Making the Grade?:
Hearing on Examination of VA Regional Office Disability Claims Quality Review
Methods Before the Subcommittee on Disability Assistance and Memorial Affairs
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, 111th Cong. (March 24, 2010) (statement of Be-
linda J. Finn, Assistant Inspector Gen. for Audits and Evaluations) (discussing
inadequacies of the VA’s current programs and offering recommendations for im-
provement); see also Claims Summit 2010: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Vet-
erans’ Affairs, 111th Cong. (2010); Examining Appellate Processes and Their
Impact on Veterans: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Disability Assistance and
Memorial Affairs of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009), avail-
able at http://www.veteranslawlibrary.com/files/House_Hrg_Transcripts/H.Hrg.
111-19.pdf; Review of Veterans’ Disability Compensation: What Changes Are
Needed to Improve the Appeals Process?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Veter-
ans’ Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009); Riley, supra note 29 (discussing flaws of the cur-
rent veterans’ benefits system).
236. 434 F. Supp. 1252, 1261 (D. Conn. 1976).
237. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163, 177 (1803); see LaDuke v. Nel-
son, 762 F.2d 1318, 1325 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that the judiciary “has been
vested with the ultimate authority to determine the constitutionality of the ac-
tions of the other branches of the federal government”).
238. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961).
239. LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1325 (“[T]he executive branch has no discretion with which
to violate constitutional rights.”).
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unelected administrators are in many ways shielded from the demo-
cratic accountability that, at least in theory, constrains the actions
taken by elected officials.240  Thus, to prevent the type of arbitrary
government action that is likely to increase as accountability de-
creases, judicial enforcement of constitutional rights is a necessity.241
Given the pervasiveness of administrative regulation—from drivers
and professional licenses to disability and welfare benefits, from com-
mercial activities to the operation of prisons242—the importance of a
judiciary willing and able to provide a check on irresponsible agency
action cannot be understated.243  With regard to the substantial de-
lays facing veterans, a judicial remedy is vital to ensuring that the
VA’s claims adjudication process affords veterans procedural due pro-
cess.  Accordingly, Article III courts must fulfill their constitutional
imperative and issue injunctive relief to veterans.244
A. Injunctive Relief in the Context of Administrative Delay
What is a remedy?  The traditional view is that a remedy is the
enforcement provision of a right—that is, “it is what a plaintiff re-
240. Sara B. Tosdal, Note, Preserving Dignity in Due Process, 462 HASTINGS L.J. 1003,
1036 (2011); see Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms,
Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J.
377, 401–02 (2006) (explaining that administrative law is focused “on problems
raised by the exercise of [agency] discretion,” among which is “the danger that
permitting undemocratic, extraconstitutional decisionmakers to construe the law
unfettered by precise statutory mandate will foster arbitrary or unreflective gov-
ernance”); Marshall J. Breger, The Structure of Government Accountability: Gov-
ernment Accountability in the Twenty-First Century, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 423, 434
(referencing the “traditional concern that the administrative state, if unchecked,
would likely act arbitrarily and capriciously”); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond
Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461, 494 (explaining that “the concern for arbitrary administrative
decisionmaking” is “a concern of paramount importance in the administrative
state”); cf. CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDI-
CIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 6 (1990) (“As the bureaucracy’s role has grown, so
have the risks and benefits associated with official action.”).
241. Tosdal, supra note 240, at 1036.
242. Id. at 1007.
243. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); THE FEDERALIST
No.78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that
there are situations in which the judiciary’s refusal to act would threaten the
Constitution’s protections of individual rights and against encroachment by the
government).
244. In addition to injunctive relief, veterans should also be afforded declaratory re-
lief, which is the remedial power of Article III courts to “declare the rights and
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such a declaration, whether
or not further relief is or could be sought.”  28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006).  Declara-
tory judgment delineates important rights and responsibilities and is “a message
not only to the parties but also to the public and has significant educational and
lasting importance.” Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F.2d 1462, 1471 (9th Cir. 1984). For
purposes of this Article, however, we focus on injunctive relief.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-2\NEB205.txt unknown Seq: 35  6-DEC-11 14:58
422 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:388
ceives to cure the legal wrong committed against her.”245  Or, in even
more general terms, “a remedy is anything a court can do for a litigant
who has been wronged or is about to be wronged.”246  The existence of
a remedy is important because it enables a right to be characterized as
legal, rather than as moral or natural;247 as Paul Gewirtz puts it,
“[t]he function of a remedy is to ‘realize’ a legal norm [and] to make it
a ‘living truth’” so it can be “effective in the real world.”248
Judges use remedies to provide redress for past harm or to prevent
future harm from occurring.249  To safeguard constitutional rights,
courts often utilize the equitable remedy of injunctive relief,250 which
effectuates the latter objective.  Injunctive relief is a judicial command
that an errant party “do, or refrain from doing, some specified act.”251
245. Tracy A. Thomas, Congress’ Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 673, 679 (2001).  While a cause of action bestows upon a litigant the right
“to seek judicial relief from injuries caused by another’s violation of a substantive
legal requirement,” Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 730 n.1 (1979) (Powell,
J., dissenting), a remedy is the type of relief a court grants.
246. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 1 (2d ed. 1994).
247. Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy
Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633, 1639 (2004) (“The enforcement
power of the remedy is the quality that converts pronouncements of ideals into
operational rights. It is this enforceability that makes something a legal rather
than a moral or natural right.”).
248. Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 587 (1983) (“Our con-
stitutional ideal of equal justice under law is thus made a living truth.” (quoting
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 20 (1958))).
249. LAYCOCK, supra note 246, at 1.
250. Carolyn Grose, Note,“Put Your Body on the Line”: Civil Disobedience and Injunc-
tions, 59 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1497, 1517 (1994).  The injunction’s modern founda-
tion was laid by the Supreme Court’s landmark 1954 opinion in Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  After declaring that the existence of segre-
gated schools violated the plaintiff students’ constitutional right to a desegre-
gated public education, the Court imposed the affirmative remedy of a mandatory
injunction—instead of simply declaratory or prohibitory relief—to induce what it
found was constitutionally-required change.  Thomas, supra note 247, at 1633.
In so doing, the Court allowed the injunction’s “contemporary character and po-
tency” to emerge.  Gewirtz, supra note 248, at 588.  And due in part to the vehe-
ment resistance to Brown’s decree, district courts assumed an unprecedented
role, crafting detailed and strategic remedies and becoming the managers of their
implementation. Id. at 580.  Thus, Brown allowed the judiciary to embrace and
manage injunctive relief as a way to define and protect substantive constitutional
rights.  Thomas, supra note 247, at 1634.
251. McQueen v. Lustine Realty Co., 547 A.2d 172, 176 (D.C. 1988); see United Bond-
ing Ins. Co. v. Stein, 410 F.2d 483, 486 (3d Cir.1969) (“An injunction is a prohibi-
tive writ issued by a court of equity forbidding a party-defendant from certain
action, or in the case of a mandatory injunction, commanding positive action.”);
Gainsburg v. Dodge, 101 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Ark. 1937) (“ ‘A writ of injunction may
be defined as a judicial process, operating in personam, and requiring the person
to whom it is directed to do or refrain from doing a particular thing.’” (quoting
High on Injunctions (4th Ed.) § 1, p. 2)); Inhabitants of Lincolnville v. Perry, 104
A.2d 884, 887 (Me. 1954) (“An injunction has been well described as a judicial
process whereby a party is required to do or refrain from doing a particular
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However, the fact that a plaintiff succeeds on the merits of a constitu-
tional claim does not necessarily entitle him to an injunction.  Rather,
as the Supreme Court has explained, the decision to issue an injunc-
tion is “a matter of equitable discretion” left to the trial judge.252  That
discretion currently functions within the boundaries of a four-factor
test articulated by the Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., under which a plaintiff seeking an injunction must establish
four factors: (1) irreparable injury; (2) inadequate remedies available
at law; (3) that a remedy in equity is warranted after balancing the
hardships; and (4) that the public interest “would not be disserved by
a permanent injunction.”253  Given the emphasis placed upon balanc-
ing the hardships and the public interest, the eBay test substantially
thing.”); Bellows v. Ericson, 46 N.W.2d 654, 658 (Minn. 1951) (“ ‘A writ of injunc-
tion may be defined as a judicial process, operating in personam, and requiring
the person to whom it is directed to do or to refrain from doing a particular
thing.’ ” (quoting 3 Dunneil, Dig. § 4467)); Cutten v. Latshaw, 344 S.W.2d 257,
262 (Mo. App. 1961) (“ ‘An injunction is a writ framed according to the circum-
stances of the case commanding an act which the court regards as essential to
justice, or restraining an act which it esteems contrary to equity and good con-
science.’” (quoting 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 1, p. 405)); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
705 (5th ed. 1979); 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions §§ 1–2 (1969); 43 C.J.S. Injunctions
§ 2 (1978).
252. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008).
253. 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (explaining that this test reflects “well-established prin-
ciples of equity”); see also Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743,
2757 (U.S. 2010) (“An injunction should issue only if the traditional four-factor
test [established in eBay] is satisfied.”).  However, remedies scholars have criti-
cized the eBay formulation of the test as not reflecting reality. See, e.g., LAYCOCK,
supra note 246, at 57 (“There is no ‘familiar’ four-factor test.”); John M. Golden,
The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of
Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 695 (2009) (criticizing the test as
being “something of a hoax”); Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Dis-
cretion Following eBay v. MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63, 76 n.71 (2007) (“Rem-
edies specialists had never heard of the four-point test . . . .  [T]he Court appears
to vindicate a ‘traditional’ standard for a final injunction that never existed, ex-
cept perhaps for a preliminary injunction.”).  These scholars note that although
there is a four-factor test courts traditionally conduct prior to issuing preliminary
injunctions, the Court’s attempt at translating those factors into a test for insti-
tuting permanent injunctions should have produced a three-factor test due to the
elimination of the need to ascertain “the probability that [the movant] will suc-
ceed on the merits.”  Golden, supra, at 695 (explaining that “[b]y the time a per-
manent injunction is at issue, this probability-of-success factor effectively drops
out,” since “[b]y this time, the movant must have actually prevailed on the mer-
its”) (quoting 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAYE
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948, at 133 (2d ed. 1995)).  Instead,
the Court “obtained four factors by doubling up, confusingly, on the irreparable
harm factor, redundantly restating it as a requirement that legal remedies be
inadequate.”  Golden, supra, at 695.  The Court also stated a retrospective test for
irreparable harm—asking whether a plaintiff “has suffered an irreparable in-
jury”—instead of prospectively asking whether a plaintiff would continue to suf-
fer that irreparable injury. Id. at 696.  Regardless of these serious problems,
though, for now, the eBay test remains the law guiding the imposition of perma-
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-2\NEB205.txt unknown Seq: 37  6-DEC-11 14:58
424 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:388
overlaps with the Mathews analysis.  It is therefore unsurprising that
just as the nature, severity, and impact of the VA’s appellate delay
justifies the finding of a due process violation, so too does it justify the
issuance of an injunction under the eBay test.
The first eBay factor asks whether a plaintiff has suffered an “ir-
reparable injury,” which is an injury that defies measure or cannot be
adequately compensated by money.254  Unfortunately, although the
existence of an irreparable injury is the touchstone of injunctive re-
lief,255 its application is less than clear; indeed, this requirement is
regularly maligned by courts and commentators alike for its obfusca-
tion of the remedial inquiry.256  As a general matter, irreparable in-
jury does not demand that the threatened injury actually be incapable
of being compensated, but only that it be “substantial and serious”
enough to justify the injunctive relief being sought.257  Courts regu-
larly find irreparable injury where a plaintiff’s loss cannot be re-
placed, such as with real property, unique personal property, or where
intangible rights have been violated, such as in civil rights and envi-
ronmental litigation.258  Among these categories, the inquiry is fact-
sensitive, requiring courts to ascertain where along the spectrum of
severity a particular injury resides.259  Moreover, in the context of
deprivations of constitutional rights, there is a presumption that a
deprivation results in irreparable harm.260
nent injunctions, and we therefore use it to establish that a permanent injunction
should be entered against the VA.
254. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 856–57 (9th ed. 2009).
255. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 712 (1977); Steffel v. Thompson, 415
U.S. 452, 462–66 (1974).
256. See, e.g., Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 698 (2d Cir. 1966) (noting
that “recitation of irreparable injury generally produces more dust than light”);
Grose, supra note 250, at 1514 (noting that showing irreparable harm is not easy
because it is not entirely clear what the term “irreparable” means); Douglas Lay-
cock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 689 (1990)
(noting the “confusion” caused by the irreparable harm requirement).
257. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 856–57 (9th ed. 2009) (quoting ELIAS MERWIN, PRINCI-
PLES OF EQUITY AND EQUITY PLEADING 426–27 (H.C. Merwin ed., 1896)).  For a
meditation on the complexities of irreparable harm, see Laycock, supra note 256,
at 703–14.
258. Laycock, supra note 256, at 703–14.
259. For example, suspension of a plaintiff’s driving privilege is not serious enough to
constitute irreparable injury.  MacBeth v. Utah, 332 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Utah
1971).
260. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1973) (explaining that where plaintiffs have
established the deprivation of a constitutional right, there is a presumption that
this deprivation results in irreparable harm); see also Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d
468, 482 (1996) (noting the “presumption of irreparable injury that flows from a
violation of constitutional rights”).  Although some have argued that the eBay
test eliminated this presumption due to its direction that “the plaintiff must
demonstrate” the existence of the four factors, see Golden, supra note 254, at 697,
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Wherever the boundaries of the irreparable harm requirement
may actually lie, there is little doubt that if the requirement is to have
any meaning at all, then the profound harm suffered by veterans must
qualify as such.  The grim statistics presented in Part III evidence
that the harm caused by the VA’s delays is economic, threatening vet-
erans’ financial viability; physical, causing many veterans to live
without essential health care and basic necessities; and psychological,
disrupting veterans’ attempts to reintegrate into society while forcing
them to endure a prolonged legal battle with the very government
they enlisted to defend.  Further, the longer the appeals process con-
tinues, the greater the harm becomes; indeed, the VA itself has admit-
ted that the length of time required to resolve appeals is likely to
increase, rather than decrease, in coming years.261  Thus, the irrepa-
rable harm requirement is met.
The second eBay factor requires that legal remedies, such as mone-
tary relief, be inadequate to compensate for an injury.262  This factor
substantially overlaps with, if not duplicates, the irreparable injury
requirement263—indeed, as the judge who applied the newly minted
four-factor eBay test on remand opined, “the irreparable harm inquiry
and remedy at law inquiry are essentially two sides of the same
coin.”264  Because of the widespread and severe psychological and
physical impact caused by the VA’s delays, the challenge of calculating
the monetary value of the deprivation and the resulting damages
would be nearly insurmountable.265  Moreover, a legal remedy is con-
sidered inadequate when it will not sufficiently deter a repeated viola-
tion by the defendant, but instead will cause a plaintiff to engage in
another lawsuit involving the same issues.266  Here, even if the VA
it is not at all clear that the Court intended to do so, particularly in the context of
violations of constitutional rights.
261. Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d. 1049, 1074 (N.D. Cal.
2008) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, sub nom. Veterans for Common Sense v. Shin-
seki, 644 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2011).
262. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
263. Laycock, supra note 256, at 694 (“The irreparable injury rule has two formula-
tions. Equity will act only to prevent irreparable injury, and equity will act only if
there is no adequate legal remedy. The two formulations are equivalent; what
makes an injury irreparable is that no other remedy can repair it.”).
264. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 592 n.11 (E.D. Va.
2007); accord Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952)
(noting the similarity of these two factors); Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s
Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63, 87
(2007) (noting that the “inadequate legal remedy and irreparable injury seem to
be functionally, at least, one test”).
265. See Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1048 (9th Cir. 1998).
266. Doug Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite for an Injunction,
33 U. FLA. L. REV. 346, 349 (1981) (explaining that courts should issue an injunc-
tion in a case where, “[i]f the court simply awards monetary damages, the defen-
dant will probably continue his actions”); cf. Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Kansas-
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were to compensate veterans for their past injuries, the thousands of
veterans who will surely continue to suffer from the ever-growing de-
lays would have no recourse but to bring future lawsuits against the
VA, creating a perpetual cycle of lawsuits and litigation.267  Thus,
given that the VA’s unconstitutional delays are likely to continue for
the foreseeable future without some form of judicial intervention, an
injunction is the only way to prevent their future recurrence.
The third factor requires a court to balance the hardships between
the plaintiff and the defendant,268 which entails a fact-sensitive judi-
cial evaluation of the potential consequences of an injunction.269  The
emphasis in balancing the interests of both parties is on avoiding eco-
nomic waste; as Professor James Fischer puts it, “the defendant’s cost
of complying with the injunction should not be inappropriately large
relative to the plaintiff’s benefits gained from obtaining the injunc-
tion.”270  And like the substantially similar balancing test required
under the third prong of the Mathews balancing test indicates, the
weighing of the interests here overwhelmingly tips the scales in favor
of veterans.271  The significant benefit of timely claims adjudication to
veterans defies monetization.
Conversely, whatever economic hardship that an injunction
against the VA might cause is undercut by the unprecedented increase
in its yearly budget,272 the fact that the VA has not asserted a lack of
resources as a rationale for the delays, and the stunning inefficiencies
of the VA’s claims adjudication process that are at least partially re-
sponsible for the delays.  Thus, when these facts are viewed in light of
the struggles that veterans experience, there is little doubt that the
equities favor veterans.  The VA’s hardship in executing the contem-
plated injunction—mandatory deadlines and payment of interim ben-
Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 349 F. Supp. 670, 681 (D. Neb. 1972) (noting that
nothing suggested the “likelihood of recurrences of past behavior,” making in-
junctive relief unnecessary); Johnson v. Mansfied Hardwood Lumber Co., 143 F.
Supp. 826, 834–35 (W.D. La. 1956) (showing that multiple suits “could or would
be required” was enough to show that plaintiffs did not have an adequate legal
remedy).
267. See LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1330 (9th Cir. 1985), amended, 796 F.2d
309 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that the high likelihood that violations will recur ab-
sent issuance of an injunction counsels in favor of equitable rather than legal
relief).
268. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
269. David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace Bal-
ancing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627, 633 (1988).
270. James M. Fischer, What Hath eBay v. MercExchange Wrought?, 14 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 555, 565 (2010).
271. See supra subsection III.B.4.
272. See generally Rowland, supra note 229.
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efits, discussed infra273—is low in comparison to the severe hardships
veterans endure while they await decisions on their benefits claims.
Finally, the fourth factor requires that the public interest “not be
disserved by a permanent injunction,” which demands that the pro-
posed injunction not be contrary to public policy.274  Far from being
disserved, the public has a clear interest in ensuring that veterans are
adequately cared for and that the VA is able to fulfill its mission.  In
fact, given that veterans are entitled to disability benefits as a conse-
quence of their service, ensuring that those who are injured in the
course of their service are provided their disability benefits in a timely
manner is a compelling public interest.  In the words of one federal
district court:
When a government agency has unreasonably delayed action in a manner
that affects not only the property rights of hundreds of thousands of American
citizens, but also undermines their fundamental rights of survival, the issu-
ance of an order that will compel the agency to comply with its legal obliga-
tions to those citizens in a reasonable manner directly advances the public
interest.275
Thus, the public interest factor weighs in favor of issuing an
injunction.
In sum, applying the eBay factors to veterans’ due process claims
demonstrates that the veterans’ claims are sufficient to support an in-
junction.  A question still remains, however, as to its proper scope,
which is a function of the breadth of the violation.276  Federal courts
have previously granted system-wide injunctive relief against admin-
istrative agencies for violating the constitutional rights of individu-
als;277 in these cases, the analysis centers upon whether the injury is
in fact “widespread enough to justify systemwide relief.”278  As the
Ninth Circuit has noted, system-wide injunctive relief is “required” if
a violation is “attributable to policies or practices pervading the whole
273. See infra section IV.B (discussing the content of the proposed injunction).
274. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
275. Cobell v. Norton, 283 F. Supp. 2d 66, 212–13 (D.D.C. 2003), vacated in part, 392
F.3d 461 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
276. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 360 (1996) (citation omitted); see also Dayton Bd. of
Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 417 (1977) (“[I]nstead of tailoring a remedy
commensurate with the three specific violations, the Court of Appeals imposed a
systemwide remedy going beyond their scope.”).
277. See Daniel J. Walker, Note, Administrative Injunctions: Assessing the Propriety of
Non-Class Collective Relief, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1119, 1151 (2005) (“[I]t is now
beyond question that federal courts have the power to issue [nationwide and
class-wide relief].”).  For example, in Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir.
1998), the Ninth Circuit upheld a permanent injunction against the Immigration
and Naturalization Service after analyzing the adequacy of legal remedies and
the existence of an irreparable injury, and then balancing the equities. Id. at
1048.
278. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 359; see also Brinkman, 433 U.S. at 420 (“Only if there has
been a systemwide impact may there be a systemwide remedy.”).
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system (even though injuring a relatively small number of plaintiffs),
or if the unlawful policies or practices affect such a broad range of
plaintiffs that an overhaul of the system is the only feasible manner in
which to address the . . . injury.”279  Since the unconstitutional delays
in the adjudication of veterans’ benefits are both a direct result of VA
policies and practices and are national in scope, system-wide injunc-
tive relief is surely justified.280  With that in mind, in the next section,
we discuss the contours of our proposal for a system-wide injunction
against the VA.
B. Mandatory Deadlines as Injunctive Relief for
Administrative Delay
The VA’s claims processing and adjudicatory systems must be fun-
damentally transformed to adequately protect the constitutional
rights of our nation’s veterans.  Secretary Shinseki has begun this pro-
cess, demonstrating a willingness to change and showing encouraging
signs of improvement.281  But there is still a long way to go before the
VA’s claims adjudication process operates within the constitutional
limitations of the Fifth Amendment.  While Congress and the VA con-
tinue to work toward addressing these problems, an injunction must
be issued in the interim in order to compel compliance with the Con-
stitution.  Such an injunction must not only require the VA to reduce
its delays by specific dates, but must also allow veterans to automati-
cally obtain benefits if the delays persist beyond the deadlines
imposed.
Given the chronic delays disabled veterans face and the unique
sensitivities they possess, the proper remedial action is an injunction
consisting of the following: (1) a determination of the amount of time
beyond which delay violates the Constitution;282 (2) a transition pro-
cess that employs multiple deadlines, enabling the VA to gradually
shorten its delays until they no longer violate the Constitution; (3) a
provision entitling veterans to interim payments in an amount
279. Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 870 (9th Cir. 2001).
280. Finally, it is worth pointing out that certain concerns relevant to imposing in-
junctive relief in other circumstances are not relevant to whether courts should
impose an injunction against the VA.  While there are federalism concerns impli-
cated when federal courts order state agencies to act, those concerns are not rele-
vant here, where federal courts would be ordering a federal agency to act.
Indeed, “none of the considerations inherent in the judicial concept of ‘Our Feder-
alism’ are implicated in the constitutional challenges to executive branch behav-
ior in federal courts.”  LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1325 (1985) (citations
omitted).
281. See The Promise Audit, supra note 132.
282. In devising this deadline, courts should be particularly sensitive to the severity of
the harm suffered by veterans while they endure these prolonged delays: bank-
ruptcy, home foreclosure, divorce, psychological dysfunction, and in some cases,
suicide. See supra notes 196–201 and accompanying text.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\90-2\NEB205.txt unknown Seq: 42  6-DEC-11 14:58
2011] VETERANS’ BENEFITS AND DUE PROCESS 429
equivalent to the benefits being claimed if the VA fails to meet those
deadlines; (4) a provision entitling the VA to recoup those interim pay-
ments if veterans do not prevail on appeal; and (5) a grace period for
the VA to begin implementing the injunction.
We now consider the virtues of this approach.  First, establishing
the outer bounds of procedural due process by imposing a hard dead-
line provides the VA with clear, identifiable guidance.  Further, by al-
lowing for a grace period and utilizing a graduated process to
transition the VA into compliance with the fixed deadline, our ap-
proach strikes a normatively desirable compromise between the bur-
den of implementing such a substantial reform and the need to
expediently mitigate the negative effects of the delays.  Relatedly, the
payment of interim benefits ensures that veterans receive the support
they desperately need within the limitations set by that compromise.
To be sure, paying interim benefits involves clear risks—namely, pay-
ing benefits to those who are either undeserving or intentionally tak-
ing advantage of the system—but they are a necessary sacrifice in the
attempt to ensure that deserving veterans receive vital support in a
timely fashion.  Allowing for a grace period, benchmarks, and a right
to recoup undeserving payments minimizes these risks to the greatest
extent possible.
Regarding the temporal content of the injunction, courts can and
should allow flexibility as to the way in which the VA meets the dead-
lines, as long as it does meet them.  There are numerous avenues the
VA could take to help it process appeals more quickly, such as: asking
Congress for more funding, increasing staff at the Board or shifting
staff roles, providing better training to Regional Office staff to lessen
the errors made, or increasing efficiency and better utilizing available
technology.  The injunction should enable the VA to take advantage of
all of these methods, or any other that it develops, while deferring to
the agency’s expertise in managing its own affairs.283
Additionally, in order to manage the challenges inherent in devel-
oping, implementing, and monitoring a systemic injunction against
the VA, courts might consider appointing a special master to assist
with the process.284  Judicially mandated institutional reform re-
quires technical expertise and a substantial investment of time;285 by
delegating authority to an outside expert to oversee this process,
courts can effectively ensure compliance while conserving vital judi-
283. See Cockrum v. Califano, 475 F. Supp. 1222, 1240 (D.D.C. 1979); Armstrong v.
Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 883–84 (9th Cir. 2001) (Berzon, J., concurring); Walters v.
Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1053 (9th Cir. 1998).
284. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (authorizing the appointment of a special master).
285. See Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision
of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1295.
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cial resources.286  Special masters have been appointed in the past to
assist with desegregating schools, addressing systemic problems in
state prisons, and eradicating discriminatory practices in a federal
agency.287  Special masters can be used to accomplish a range of tasks
necessary to facilitate court-ordered institutional reform, including
developing the injunction, supervising compliance, providing assis-
tance to the defendant organization, communicating ongoing develop-
ments to the judge, and monitoring whether the injunction should be
amended in light of new developments.288  With regard to the injunc-
tion we propose here, a special master could fulfill any or all of these
functions, filling in the basic injunctive framework outlined above and
carrying it to fruition so as to ensure compliance with the court’s
decree.
It is also important to note that the specific type of injunctive relief
we propose here is not without precedent.  For example, in White v.
Mathews, a federal district court remedied constitutional violations
caused by administrative delay in the social security benefits process
by imposing an injunction with fixed deadlines.289  In White, a district
court judge determined that 306 days had passed between White’s pe-
tition for a hearing and the ALJ’s final decision.290  The judge also
made the following findings, which are remarkably similar to, al-
though notably less severe than, the delays currently endured by dis-
abled veterans:
The plaintiff’s experience with the SSA appeals process is not unique.  As a
result of various factors . . . , an extremely large backlog of cases has devel-
286. James S. DeGraw, Rule 53, Inherent Powers, and Institutional Reform: The Lack
of Limits on Special Masters, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 800, 802 (1991); see generally
Shira Scheindlin, We Need Help: The Increasing Use of Special Masters in Fed-
eral Court, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 479, 481–87 (2009) (discussing the benefits of ap-
pointing a special master).
287. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1926 (May 23, 2011) (explaining that
“[t]he court appointed a Special Master to oversee development and implementa-
tion of a remedial plan of action”); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.
1976) (using special masters to develop desegregation plans for Boston public
schools); Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff’d, 679 F.2d 1115
(5th Cir. 1982) (using a special master to reform Texas Department of Correc-
tions); Pigford v. Glickman, 206 F.3d 1212, 1215 (2000) (using a special master to
review the United States Department of Agriculture’s compliance with a consent
decree resolving allegations of discrimination on behalf of African-American
farmers in the processing of credit and benefit applications).
288. Horowitz, supra note 285, at 1298.  Courts have broad and flexible power to mod-
ify the injunctive relief they institute.  N.Y. State Assn. for Retarded Children,
Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 967 (2d Cir. 1983).  As the Supreme Court recently
explained in Plata, “[a] court that invokes equity’s power to remedy a constitu-
tional violation by an injunction mandating systemic changes to an institution
has the continuing duty and responsibility to assess the efficacy and conse-
quences of its order.”  131 S. Ct. 1910, at 1946.
289. 434 F. Supp. 1252, 1261–62 (D. Conn. 1976).
290. Id. at 1254.
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oped in the SSA’s Hearings and Appeals Bureau.  In April of 1975, there was a
record total backlog of 113,000 pending cases nationwide.  The result has been
a chronic delay in the disposition of appeals.  During the period between Janu-
ary 1973 and March 1975 the average waiting period between an initial re-
quest for hearing and the entry of a final decision was 195.2 days nationally,
and 211.8 days for petitions in Connecticut or, approximately six and one-half
and seven months respectively.
. . .  The incidence of reversals by administrative law judges exceeds 50 per-
cent of all the cases heard.  The reversal rate is much lower, to be sure, when
measured against the total number of original denials, many of which are not
appealed.  However with respect to those individuals who feel sufficiently ag-
grieved with the Agency’s decision to seek an appeal (the relevant class in this
case), the prospects for reversal are substantial.291
Concluding that the appellate delays violated the applicants’ con-
stitutional rights, the judge entered an injunction imposing
mandatory deadlines for the Social Security Administration to shorten
the delays within its adjudicatory body.292  The judge’s order required
the SSA to “reduce[ ] the maximum delay” to 180 days by July 1, 1977;
to 150 days by the end of December 1977; and to 120 days by July 1,
1978.293  If the SSA failed to meet these deadlines, then it was re-
quired to dispense benefits to applicants “as though favorable action
had been taken” in their case, “subject to termination upon a subse-
quent unfavorable hearing result.”294  The court further required that
if an unfavorable hearing result occurred, “the SSA [was] entitled to
full recoupment for interim amounts paid in the meantime.”295  Fi-
nally, the court also provided the SSA with a one-year grace period to
begin complying with the injunction.296
The government appealed the order to the Second Circuit, which
affirmed the trial court’s decision.297  The court described the order as
a “laudable effort” and as an effective “equitable solution to the diffi-
cult problem of balancing administrative difficulties and wage earn-
ers’ needs.”298  The government subsequently filed a petition for
certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, which was denied.299
291. Id. at 1254–56 (footnotes omitted).
292. Id. at 1261–62.
293. Id. at 1261.
294. Id. at 1262.  The court further held that “[e]xcludable from the foregoing time
limitation shall be such periods of delay as are caused directly by a petitioner’s
own failure to provide essential information for an adjudication.” Id.
295. White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852, 860 (2d Cir. 1977).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Califano v. White, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).  Seven years later, in Heckler v. Day, 467
U.S. 104 (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down “an injunction issued on
behalf of a statewide class” that required “the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to adjudicate all future disputed disability claims under Title II of the
Social Security Act . . . according to judicially established deadlines and to pay
interim benefits in all cases of noncompliance with those deadlines.” Id. at 105.
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To be sure, the types of challenges facing veterans—a backlog of
cases, chronic delay in the disposition of appeals, and a high reversal
and remand rate—are remarkably similar to those faced by the bene-
fits applicants in White, albeit more pronounced, given the greater
length of delays facing veterans.  As a result, the content of the injunc-
tion we propose here finds specific support in the White injunction,
lending credence to the use of fixed deadlines to remedy delays in ad-
ministrative action.300
The proposed injunction also finds support in a recent ground-
breaking Supreme Court decision, Brown v. Plata,301 which upheld a
similarly-styled injunction addressing systemic constitutional viola-
tions by the government.  In Plata, the plaintiffs brought a lawsuit
against the state of California alleging that overcrowded conditions in
its prison system violated the prisoners’ Eighth Amendment right to
be free of cruel and unusual punishment.302  The district court agreed,
concluding that the prison population, which was nearly double the
prison system’s designed capacity, could not be larger than 137.5% of
that capacity in order to remain compliant with the Eighth
Amendment.303
Based on this finding, the district court crafted an injunction so as
to bring California’s prison system within constitutional limits.  It or-
dered the State of California to develop a plan to reduce the prison
population to 137.5% of design capacity in two years,304 and to submit
the plan to the court for approval, which, after one failed attempt, the
state did.305  Without endorsing the particular content of the state’s
However, the district court issuing that injunction never reached the plaintiff’s
due process claims, and therefore, Heckler does not speak to a federal district
court’s ability to enter an injunction imposing mandatory deadlines premised
upon a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 110
n.13; see also id. at 131 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (“Excepting, of course, those
cases where denial of benefits rises to the level of violations of due process, I
would agree that the problem of delay may at times not be susceptible to judicial
solution.”).
300. White v. Mathews, 434 F. Supp. 1252, 1255–56 (D. Conn. 1976).
301. 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
302. Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2711, at *30 (Jan. 12, 2010).
303. Id.
304. Id. at *30–31.  Litigation regarding prisons is governed by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 104th Cong. (1996), which al-
lows a three-judge district court to issue an order limiting a prison population in
certain circumstances. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1929 (“When necessary to ensure com-
pliance with a constitutional mandate, courts may enter orders placing limits on
a prison’s population.”).  As a result, the Plata district court based its decision to
issue a population-limiting injunction on the requirements of the PLRA, not on
those of eBay.  However, the remedial principle underlying the Plata decision,
that “[c]ourts . . . must not shrink from their obligation to enforce the constitu-
tional rights of all persons,” is directly relevant. Id. at 1928.
305. Coleman, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2711 at *30–*31.
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plan—allowing it to change if circumstances require—the court insti-
tuted a series of four six-month benchmarks for the state to meet;
these benchmarks required an incremental reduction in the prison
population until it reached the capacity of 137.5%.306
On certiorari, the Supreme Court agreed that the conditions in the
California prisons amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, and
upheld the district court’s injunction on the grounds that when “gov-
ernment fails to fulfill” its constitutional obligations, it is the courts’
“responsibility” to remedy them.307  In so doing, the Court reinforced
the notion that equitable injunctions are a useful and powerful mecha-
nism for remedying constitutional violations by government agencies,
thereby reaffirming the central role that the judicial exercise of reme-
dial power can play in safeguarding individual rights.
In sum, both White and Plata are powerful examples demonstrat-
ing that “[c]ourts . . . must not shrink from their obligation to enforce
the constitutional rights of all persons[.]”308  Just as the courts in
those cases refused to ignore government encroachment upon the indi-
vidual rights of those seeking SSA entitlements or of California prison
inmates, so too must federal courts refuse to ignore the infringement
upon veterans’ individual rights that results from the severe and
widespread delays in the VA claims adjudication process.  The delays
not only clearly violate veterans’ procedural due process rights, but
they also meet the requirements necessary for equitable relief—so the
courts must issue it.  Notwithstanding the organizational challenges
and costs of an injunction imposing mandatory deadlines and the pay-
ment of interim benefits, such an injunction is the only way to truly
ensure that our nation’s veterans receive the due process to which
they are constitutionally entitled.
V. CONCLUSION
That the VA allows so many veterans to unnecessarily suffer while
they wait for their benefits claims to be processed is truly a national
shame.  The same Constitution that empowers our President to send
American troops into battle also demands that the VA afford our veter-
306. Id. at *35–36.  The state is required to report to the court on whether it is reach-
ing these benchmarks, and to update the court on other developments, including
legislative changes. Id. at *37–38.
307. Plata, 131 S. Ct. at 1928.  The Court found authority for upholding the injunction
in the PLRA. Id. at 1922–23 (stating that “[t]he appeal presents the question
whether the remedial order issued by the three-judge court is consistent with
requirements and procedures set forth” in the PLRA, and reasoning that “[t]he
overcrowding is the ‘primary cause of the violation of a Federal right,’ 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(a)(3)(E)(i)” before concluding that “the PLRA does authorize the relief af-
forded in this case and that the court-mandated population limit is necessary to
remedy the violation of prisoners’ constitutional rights”).
308. Id. at 1928 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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ans due process of law.  The executive branch, however, is failing to
live up to its constitutional obligations, and the judiciary—as the final
arbiter of individual rights—must act within its discretion to provide
the relief to which veterans are constitutionally entitled.  Courts
should find that the VA’s unreasonable delays violate the Due Process
Clause and should institute injunctive relief that would require the VA
to either remedy its violations or begin paying interim benefits before
thousands more veterans face the same plight that so many thousands
already have.  We owe it to our veterans to do nothing less.
